Crises Resistance and Alternatives Archives - Page 2 of 3 - Centre for Urban Research on Austerity

Austerity and welfare cuts

February 8, 2017June 15, 2017abuaro01

In today’s post, Ines Newman discusses the implications of current and future welfare reforms, including the cuts planned for April. She argues that this will lead to increasing inequality and poverty, rising household debt levels with higher levels of rent and council tax arrears and that we are witnessing increased levels of maladministration by the Department of Work and Pensions.

In the first budget of this Parliament, George Osborne put in place £12b welfare cuts which came on top of the cuts in the previous Parliament. But with his departure following the Brexit vote and the worrying policies of Donald Trump, the impact of these cuts on families in the UK has slipped out of the limelight. They are however substantial and the Resolution Foundation has recently argued that they will result in ‘falling living standards for almost the entire bottom half of the working-age income distribution between this year and 2020-21’.

In April 2016, working age benefits, tax credits and the Local Housing Allowance were all frozen for four years. For example, Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) for a single unemployed person over 25 stood at £73.10. In 2009, it was already being argued that JSA was not sufficient for the essentials of life, such as food, bills and travel, and was inconsistent with a minimum standard. The real value had not changed for at least 30 years while per capita household consumption had doubled over this period. In relative terms the value had therefore halved. Now, as post Brexit inflation gathers pace, the real value of working age benefits will fall sharply, generating acute poverty.

Those with disabilities have traditionally been slightly protected through the higher Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) and through Disability Living Allowance (DLA). However in 2015, the DWP started to contact anyone getting DLA and asking them to make a new claim for a Personal Independence Payment (PIP). The Government estimates https://fullfact.org/economy/personal-independence-payment-who-are-winners-and-losers/ that out of 1.75 million DLA reassessments, 510,000 will have a reduced payment and 450,000 will have their payments removed altogether.

All those with disabilities have to go through an assessment process which is as inadequate as the Work Capability Assessment for ESA. The PIP assessment is run by ATOS who finally bowed out of the contract on the Work Capability Assessment after receiving massive bad publicity. Meanwhile as Ken Loach’s recent film ‘I, Daniel Blake’ made clear, the new contractors, Maximus, for the work capability assessment, are no better than ATOS. Finally, from April 2017, new claimants who have a recognised disability on the work related assessment but are deemed to be capable for work will see the removal of work related activity components for ESA. It will mean those receiving the benefit will see their weekly payments cut from £103 to £73 a week. Far from protecting ‘vulnerable’ households the Government is pushing more disabled households into poverty. Half of those people living in poverty are now either themselves disabled or are living with a disabled person in their household, when the higher costs they face are taken into account.

Because successive governments have failed to deal with the housing crisis, rising rents combined with the bedroom tax, council tax benefit reductions, the cap on the local housing allowance and the total benefit cap are forcing low income households into poverty and debt. Sometimes they are forced to move into poorer areas, disrupting their children’s schooling and losing the support of families and friends. In December, the New Policy Institute https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/monitoring-poverty-and-social-exclusion-2016 reported that the number of private renters in poverty has doubled over the last decade and homelessness and temporary housing has increased five years in a row. In the London Borough of Camden where I live, we know that the lower benefit cap of £23,000 is affecting 1,110 children in 383 families. While some of these are being protected by discretionary housing payments (DHP) it is unclear for how long they can be supported and we are expecting a cut in DHP in April. A household caring for a disabled child over 18 who are not able to work because of their caring responsibilities will almost inevitably be hit by the benefit cap, as will a lone parent with several small children.

Meanwhile Universal Credit (UC) is gradually being rolled out. Using the language of giving more responsibility to the claimant, UC includes housing benefit (rather than this benefit being paid direct to the landlord) and is paid monthly in arrears. The result has been a massive increase in council rent arrears (85% of those on UC in Camden), partly as a result of delays and miscalculations in the housing element and by an understaffed DWP. From 11 April 2016, the rules on UC work allowances were changed to make them far less generous in a number of cases. The work allowance is the amount an individual or family can earn before their maximum UC award starts to be reduced. The reductions to the UC work allowances announced in the Summer Budget will ultimately have a similar impact to the changes to tax credits which were fought off by various lobby groups at the time of Osborne’s budget. Other changes in UC are significant too. From April 2017, young people aged between 18 and 21 claiming universal credit will not be eligible for housing benefit and will be expected to take part in a Youth Obligation for the first six months and then apply for an apprenticeship or trainee-ship, gain work-based skills or go on mandatory work placement. This is coming in despite the Government having to scrap the previous Mandatory Work Activity programme in 2015 when many charities boycotted it and research showed it was ineffective and merely punitive. Households will not receive Universal Credit for any children born after April 2017, when they already have two children. A lone parent with no child under 3 will be expected to look for work to claim any benefit after April this year. How such parents can then provide the type of parental support that numerous studies have shown is invaluable seems not to be a consideration for this so-called ‘family orientated’ government.

The Resolution Foundation concludes: ‘the result is that the parliament from 2015-16 to 2020-21 is on course to be the worst on record for income growth in the bottom half of the working age income distribution. At the same time, we project the biggest rise in inequality since the 1980s, with inequality after housing costs reaching record highs by 2020-21. This will be the legacy of austerity.

Ines Newman is a visiting senior research fellow at CURA, a trustee of Paddington Development Trust and does social policy research on a voluntary basis for Citizens Advice Camden.

Why network governance won’t stop climate change

October 27, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

In today’s post Professor Jonathan Davies draws on Gramscian theory to argue that network governance ideology fails to engage with real power structures, and that state-society partnerships cannot stop climate change. This post was originally published on the Innovations in Climate Governance (INOGOV) website and republished with their permission

The idea of “network governance” began to grip academics and policy makers as part of the turn to the “third way” in the 1990s. Enthusiasm for networks arose from a particularly influential reading of social change. Confronted by dramatic processes of globalisation and de-traditionalisation, often associated with the passing of modernity, many thinkers reasoned that states could no longer exercise sovereign power and instead have to involve a multitude of other actors to govern successfully. Governing systems, in other words, have to become de-centred, or polycentric. As INOGOV research demonstrates, climate change governance has been strongly influenced by these ideas.

At the same time, with the decline of trade unionism in many countries, the language of “working class” disappeared from mainstream political discourse, to be replaced by “civil society”. Civil society with its networks of voluntary and community organisations is a far more palatable partner for neoliberalising states than the unions. It can be incorporated into state projects, and provide links into dispossessed and alienated communities that are abandoning the institutions of representative democracy. Working through “civil society”, state-organised networks could focus on the practical business of problem solving within the parameters of neoliberalism: trying to balance competitiveness with social cohesion, while setting aside the structural foundations of inequality and injustice. Urban living labs seeking to innovate around smart cities and sustainability are a good example of this ideology in practice. For the most idealistic thinkers, network governance ushers in a new, cooperative and communicative form of sociability capable of replacing the crumbling hierarchical edifice of modernity.

Much of my work has been concerned with the critique of this exaggerated and normatively charged theory of change (see [1], [2], [3], [4]). I argue that the idea of network governance as an “innovation” transforming the way we are governed is hopelessly idealistic. At best it is the vague premonition of a post-capitalist society incubating within the bowels of a nasty, authoritarian neoliberal conjuncture. There are multiple reasons for skepticism about “network governance”. First, there is nothing new about it. Any brief survey of early 20^th century literatures show that the kinds of institutions considered “innovative” by network enthusiasts have been around for a very long time. Second, when studied close-up, “networks” look very much like the “hierarchies” they are supposed to replace. Participatory networks, like urban living labs, tend to be cosmetic. States and corporations are by far the biggest drivers of climate change, and they determine how it is governed through duplicitous practices like carbon trading. Moreover, networks entrench inequalities of wealth and power – the very reason they are attractive to elites. They leave the dispossessions and human disasters of climate change untouched and require us to think about injustice in de-politicized vernaculars of “innovation”, “adaptivity”, “inclusion” and “sustainability”. They promise relentless “change”, but always within the parameters of the present. Like a washing machine, we are in continuous motion but never move.

To try and put network governance in its place, and situate it in a better understanding of historical continuity and change, I turned to the work of Italian revolutionary, Antonio Gramsci (see [1], [2]). Gramsci developed a theory of politics, in which state and civil society are deeply enmeshed. He argued that the coercive and consensus-building tactics and strategies of government play out on the terrain of civil society. Gramsci’s definition of civil society was much broader than the rather benign world of voluntary organisations depicted in democratic theory. He included the media and education systems, while today’s Gramscian scholars also point to the power of charitable foundations. Much of what we call “civil society” is either closely linked to corporations and the state, or depends on them for donations, grants and contracts. Swathes of civil society are hierarchical, predatory and conservative. Gramsci called this deep web of entanglements and inter-dependencies “the integral state”, Lo Stato Integrale. He argued that government “educates” civil society through a myriad of coercive and consensus-building techniques. When states are threatened with revolution, he said, a well-organised civil society turns out to be their best protection.

Studied through the lens of the integral state, what we call “network governance” looks very conventional and not at all “innovative”. States may be shedding their postwar welfare and redistributive functions, but its coercive functions have not disappeared. On the contrary, they are coming to the fore. When we look at the anatomy of state-organised governing networks, we find coercive managerialism everywhere. In participatory mechanisms state managers control agendas, while those seeking to politicize an issue are often quickly marginalized. Informal networks, on the other hand, reinforce the power of governing elites and corporate interests, which dominate climate change decisions. Under austerity, participatory mechanisms are either set aside or tasked with advising on where the state should make its cuts. Even the much-vaunted participatory budgeting mechanisms of Latin America are widely recognized to be in decline. And, in hindsight, they didn’t exercise that much control over the governing apparatus to start with.

The point is not that public participation is bad, or that polycentric systems do not exist in some circumstances. It is rather that branding unremarkable practices as new, radical or innovative can be dangerous because it conceals deep continuities and asymmetries in the structures of power. In the age of authoritarian neoliberalism, network governance is little more than a sticking plaster for the gaping wounds of late capitalism, of which climate change is among the worst.

Jonathan S. Davies is Professor of Critical Policy Studies and Director of the Centre for Urban Research on Austerity at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK

Spanish Elections 26J: The Challenges for Unidos Podemos

August 25, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

In this blog post Juan Carlos Monedero, co-founder of Podemos and Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, reflects on the results of the Spanish elections on the 26^th June, and their significance for the development of a counter-hegemonic politics. The blog was originally written in Spanish and translated by CURA’s Dr Mercè Cortina Oriol. The original version is copied at the bottom of the article.

The regime crisis identified in Spain since 2008 and the emergence of new political parties on both the right (Ciudadanos) and the left (Unidos Podemos) are a sign of a process that affects the entire European Union. The fight against the regime of 1978 (the year of the Spanish Constitution) that Unidos Podemos represents transcends the two poles that have epitomized Spanish (and European) politics: on the one hand, those who want to change the postwar social contract taking the neoliberal precepts and the frame of adjustment and competitiveness (the right, the extreme right and, in a shameful fashion, the socialist international) and on the other, those who want to return to the situation prior to 2008. The original space for Podemos consists, beyond these poles, in finding an answer to the crisis of civilisation that the world is facing.

The inability of the neoliberal model in aggregating citizen demands while accomplishing the mandates of capitalist accumulation turns into a growing public disaffection, and a challenge to the authorization that the governments receive from elections. This inability is added to three inherent aspects of the neoliberal model: the rise of individualist values and the criticism of “the political”; the role of corruption, which acts in this deregulated model as a kind of lubricating system; and the supranational forms of management of global capitalism (which William I. Robinson has called the emerging transnational state). Institutional corruption exacerbates the idea of inequality and the distancing between citizens and political elites. The “transnational state”, agent of the logic of adjustments in the social state -the role that Troika is representing-, leads to a claim for greater national sovereignty. Hence the “natural” way out of the neoliberal crisis is some form of populism, that is, a challenge to the system of political representation and an appeal to the people as the constituent subject that demands the recovery of the social contract or the signing of a new one, more inclusive, one. That context explains in the EU the rise of the extreme right in many EU countries, the Brexit, as well as the 15-M movement in Spain or “Reclaim the Street” in Portugal. The difference is that in Spain, 15-M posed a story that appealed to the own diagnosis of the left –pointing at the political and economic elites as responsible of the crisis and set in motion processes that chased away xenophobia. This is where Podemos was born. And its electoral fate is closely linked to the management of that past.

The general elections in December 2015 were the verification of the breakdown of bipartisanship in Spain. The traditional transfer of votes between the rightwing (PP) and leftwing (PSOE) hegemonic parties no longer worked, and a new force, Podemos, was just 300,000 votes far from the Socialists. On the right, the emergence of Ciudadanos remained in fourth place. It failed to meet electoral expectations and was thus not able to carry out the function it was born to – to serve as a crutch to the two main parties of the regime of 1978. The novelty of the elections resulted in an institutional consternation. The inability to form a government called for new elections in June 2016. The bulk of the political discourse of all parties in the campaign focused on blaming the other formations for the need for new elections. The PP presented itself as the party of order and the recovery of a peaceful past against the current uncertainties. The PSOE returned to a leftist discourse that it had left behind when it ruled the country and reformed Article 135 of the Constitution to prioritise debt repayment over social spending. All the electoral polls were indicating that PSOE would be overtaken by Unidos Podemos, the alliance between Podemos and Izquierda Unida (the latter had won in the December election a million votes and just two seats[1], which facilitated the alliance and a replacement of its general secretariat by a younger person). The prospect of overtaking the PSOE, led to a conservative electoral campaign, amicable with the Socialist Party and aimed at retaining those votes that, supposedly, Unidos Podemos would take from the PSOE. The result, however, was not as expected. A million votes were lost between December and June, far from overtaking the PSOE who ended celebrating not having been relegated to the third place, despite achieving the worst result in their history.

Why did Unidos Podemos lose one million votes? There are several reasons. With the December elections and the failure to form a government, the “novelty factor” withered for much of the electorate. Many decided to return to abstention. Another factor was the withdrawal of the support by some Izquierda Unida voters (we could talk about more than 300,000 voters that abstained or even went to the PSOE), who were angered because of a poorly explained alliance that placed their leader in an unattractive place (the fifth in Madrid’s electoral circumscription[2]). The withdrawal of the support by these voters might also be explained by the memory of denigrations when unity between Podemos and Izquierda Unida was not possible in the December elections, as well as the ideological moderation of the alliance in an attempt to please the social-democratic voter.

This moderation in the discourse of Unidos Podemos even led Pablo Iglesias to state that Zapatero, PSOE’s President of the Spanish Government from 2004 to 2011, had been the best President of Spain’s democratic era, despite the 15-M being born in opposition to the policies of Zapatero. Iglesias also defined himself as a social democrat. This is a moderate definition even for PSOE members, who declare themselves socialist. Finally, the six elections held during the two years that Podemos has existed, have led to exhaustion. In a context of continuous elections, the representative, media-oriented and hierarchical side of the party have prevailed, while leaving aside the more deliberative and horizontal side represented by “the circles”[3]. That is to say, the side that is more closely linked to the desire for change that the 15-M forged.

The difficulties in forming a government after the June elections re-emphasised the failure of bipartisanship, but also made it clear that the alternative needs more time than that marked by a naive belief in a “Blitzkrieg” fuelled by a regime crisis. Unidos Podemos has not yet resolved its ideological corpus, its territorial or its internal organisation. As long as Unidos Podemos leaves these problems unresolved it is not likely to be seen as potentially governing force that can deliver an alternative vision for the country. Following two years of continuous elections, it’s time to take a pause to look inward and think about how it can be a new-fangled political formation that responds to contemporary challenges such as the degradation of employment, the environmental crisis, the aging of population, the growing wars, consequent migrations, rising violence as well as social anomie in general. The old parties are not offering solutions here that are not worryingly reminiscent of the decade of the thirties of the last century.

[1] The difference between seats and votes is explained by the proportional system that defines the Electoral Law in Spain. The system is based on the D’Hondt Method in combination with a plurinominal circumscription model. (TN).

[2] The electoral system in Spain is based on a closed list model for each electoral circumscription. In Spain there are 52 circumscriptions for the case of the General Elections. (TN)

[3] “The circles” are the name that took the grassroots organizations within Podemos. These organizations take the form of local assemblies. (TN)

Juan Carlos Monedero is co-founder of Podemos and Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. The blog was originally written in Spanish and translated by CURA’s Dr Mercè Cortina Oriol, with some help from Dr Adrian Bua. The original is copied in Spanish below.

La crisis de régimen que se identifica en España desde 2008, así como la irrupción de nuevas formaciones políticas tanto en la derecha -Ciudadanos- como en la izquierda -Unidos Podemos- son una señal de un proceso que afecta a toda la Unión Europea. La lucha que representa Unidos Podemos frente al régimen de 1978 (año de la Constitución) se coloca más allá de los dos polos que han resumido la política española (y europea): por un lado, los que quieren cambiar el contrato social de posguerra asumiendo los preceptos neoliberales y el marco de ajuste y competitividad (derecha, extrema derecha y, aunque de manera vergonzante, la internacional socialista) y por otro los que quieren regresar a la situación previa a 2008. El espacio original de Podemos consiste, más allá de estas impotencias, en encontrar una respuesta a la crisis de civilización que vive el mundo.

La incapacidad del modelo neoliberal de agregar demandas ciudadanas al tiempo que cumple con los mandatos de la acumulación capitalista se traduce, como es norma, en un crecimiento de la desafección ciudadana y una impugnación de la autorización para gobernar que reciben los gobiernos emanada de las elecciones. Esta incapacidad se suma a tres factores consustanciales al modelo: el auge de los valores Individualistas y la crítica a la “política”; el papel de la corrupción, que actúa en este modelo desrregulado como una suerte de lubricante del sistema; y las formas supranacionales de gestión del capitalismo global (lo que William I. Robinson ha llamado el emergente estado transnacional). La corrupción institucional exacerba la idea de desigualdad y el alejamiento de la ciudadanía respecto de las élites políticas. El “estado transnacional” agente de la lógica de los ajustes en el estado social -el papel que viene representando la Troika-, genera una reclamación de mayor soberanía nacional. De ahí que la salida “natural” a la crisis neoliberal sea alguna forma de populismo, esto es, una impugnación del sistema de representación política y una apelación al pueblo como sujeto constituyente que reclama la recuperación del contrato social o la firma de uno nuevo más inclusivo. Este marco es el que explica en la UE el auge de la extrema derecha o el Brexit, y también es el que da cuenta del movimiento 15-M en España o “Tomemos la calle” en Portugal. La diferencia estriba en que en España, el 15-M colocó un relato que apelaba al diagnóstico propio de la izquierda -culpaba a las élites políticas y económicas de la crisis- y puso en marcha procesos que ahuyentaron la xenofobia. De ahí es de donde nació Podemos. Y su suerte electoral está muy vinculada a la gestión que haga de ese pasado.

Las elecciones generales de diciembre de 2015 fueron la constatación de que el bipartidismo se había roto. El trasvase tradicional de votos entre el partido hegemónico de la derecha (PP) y el de la izquierda (PSOE) ya no funcionó y una nueva fuerza, Podemos, quedó apenas a 300.000 votos de los socialistas. Por la derecha, el surgimiento de Ciudadanos se quedó en una cuarta posición y lejos de las expectativas, por lo que no servía para lo que había nacido: servir de muleta a algunos de los dos grandes partidos del régimen de 1978. La novedad de las elecciones se tradujo en consternación Institucional. La incapacidad para formar gobierno convocó a nuevas elecciones en junio de 2016. El grueso del discurso político de todos los partidos en la campaña se centró en echar la culpa a las demás formaciones de la convocatoria de unas nuevas elecciones. El PP se ofrecía como el partido del orden y la recuperación de un pasado tranquilo frente a las incertidumbres. El PSOE regresaba al discurso izquierdista que abandonó cuando gobernó y reformó el artículo 135 de la Constitución para dar prioridad al pago de la deuda por encima del gasto social. Todas las encuestas señalaban el adelanto al PSOE por parte de Unidos Podemos (la alianza de Podemos e Izquierda Unida. Este último partido había obtenido en diciembre un millón de votos y solamente dos escaños, lo que facilitó la unión y un relevo en su secretaría general por una persona más joven), lo que llevó a una campaña electoral conservadora y amable con los socialistas dirigida a retener esos votos que, se suponía, se arrebataban al PSOE. El resultado, sin embargo, no fue el esperado, perdiendo respecto de las elecciones de diciembre un millón de votos y alejándose el “sorpasso” a los socialistas que, pese a obtener el peor resultado de su historia, celebraron como un triunfo no haber sido relegados al tercer puesto.

¿Por qué Unidos Podemos perdió un millón de votos? Las razones son varias. En las elecciones de diciembre se agotó para una parte del electorado el “factor novedad” de Podemos, que al no traducirse en gobierno decidieron regresar a la abstención. Fue importante la retirada de apoyo de una parte de los votantes de Izquierda Unida, enfadados por una alianza mal explicada que situaba a su líder en un lugar nada atractivo (el número cinco por Madrid). También influyó en estos sectores (podríamos hablar de más de 300.000 votos que se abstuvieron o votaron incluso al PSOE) la moderación ideológica a la búsqueda de contentar al votante socialdemócrata y la memoria de las descalificaciones cuando la unidad no fue posible en las elecciones de diciembre.

Esa moderación en el discurso de Unidos Podemos -Pablo Iglesias llegó a afirmar que Zapatero, del PSOE, había sido el mejor presidente de la democracia española, cuando el 15-M nació contra las políticas de Zapatero, o se definió como “socialdemócrata”, cuando esa definición es moderada incluso para los miembros del PSOE, que se definen como socialistas). Por último, seis elecciones en dos años -los de la existencia de Podemos- llevan al agotamiento, al tiempo que primaron la parte electoral, representativa, mediática y jerárquica del partido, que dejaba de lado la parte más deliberativo y horizontal que significan los círculos. Es decir, la más vinculada al deseo de cambio que marcó el 15-M.

Las dificultades para formar gobierno después de las elecciones de junio volvían a insistir en la quiebra del bipartidismo, pero también dejaban claro que la alternativa necesita más tiempo que el que marcaba una ingenua creencia en un Blitzkrieg alentado por la crisis del régimen. Unidos Podemos aún no ha resuelto ni su corpus ideológico ni su organización territorial ni su organización interna, y mientras que no cierre estos aspectos no parece probable que pueda ser vista como una fuerza de gobierno que porte una idea diferente de país.

Tras dos años de elección tras elección, le corresponde parar el balón, mirar hacia adentro y pensar cómo debe ser una formación política de nuevo cuño en el siglo XX que dé respuesta a la quiebra del mundo del trabajo, la crisis medioambiental, el envejecimiento de la población, las crecientes guerras y las consecuentes migraciones y aumento de la violencia y la anomia social. Aspectos para los que los viejos partidos no tienen solución que no recuerde inquietantemente a los años treinta del siglo pasado.

The Vulnerabilities of Local Government Liveability Services

August 11, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

In today’s post, Paul O’Brien reports on the findings of recent research that highlights the dangers posed by changes in local government for the sustainability of basic ‘liveability’ services.

The past month has been a tumultuous one for British politics. Following the referendum result in favour of Brexit, we have a new government, led by Theresa May, who has set the need to tackle the problem of inequality and to develop an inclusive economy at the forefront of her policy agenda.

A crucial aspect of this will be to tackle a looming problem that the previous government’s fiscal policy set in motion regarding neighbourhood level ‘liveability’ services. Much of the previous government’s attention was focussed upon avoiding the ‘jaws of doom’ scenario, of rising demand and underfunding of health and social care. The recent 2% health and social care precept has eased some of the pain. However less than 5% of our local population will experience social care, compared to the vast majority of local residents that rely upon on our neighbourhood level ‘liveability’ services.

On a daily basis virtually all citizens will walk in a well-lit local street. Many will drive on local roads, take their children to play in a local park, or go for a swim in a council-run pool. Local businesses benefit from public realm within local high streets. Residents will experience refuse and recycling collections provided directly to their own homes.

It is the sheer volume of these liveability services, and how they impact on the lives of our local residents, that prompted APSE with the New Policy Institute (NPI) to explore the funding vulnerabilities of these services, when compared to the priority necessarily given to social care. Our research, published in May 2016, ‘Sustainable local government finance and liveable local areas: Can we survive to 2020?’ led by Dr Peter Kenway of NPI, makes for grim reading.

Whilst the headline figures suggest cuts of 0.5% for English authorities following the budget this is skewed when financial changes are factored into the equation. Despite the 2% adult social care precept, the impact of withdrawing revenue support grant, making councils reliant upon council tax and business rates for the near totality of their funding, opens up new questions as to how liveability services can be sustained in the longer term. Some may face a further 20% of cuts on top of those already made.

Our research found that there is now a clear and compelling case for local government to campaign openly for liveability and public realm services. It also raised the issue of council tax increases and begs the question ‘is it now time for council tax reform’? We also recognised that many local councils have taken an entrepreneurial approach in supporting liveability services through better use of income generation strategies. Many sell street-scene services, for example to retail developments. Others have cultivate strategies for income in parks from rock concerts to cafes to renewable energy. Many are engaging with residents to plug the gaps left in funding – but this will only go so far.

If we allow our neighbourhood based services to decline we will force up ancillary demand on other services. There is a net contribution from good neighbourhoods. As we battle declining public health we can ill-afford to lose the services which anchor good neighbourhoods, support the wellbeing of citizens, reduce crime and make our local areas better places to do business.

Tackling this looming crisis in liveability services should take centre stage if Theresa May’s government is going to follow through on delivering a more inclusive economy that works for all.

Paul O’Brien is chief executive of the Association for Public Service Excellence, a core member of CURA and a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and Public Policy at De Montfort University

SOURCE: A Network for Change

August 5, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

In this post Federico Guerrieri introduces SOURCE, an online network coordinated by the New Economics Foundation, that is designed to catalyse collaboration between academics, policy professionals and civil society organisers from across Europe committed to tackling the biggest economic, environmental and social challenges we face today.

From solving the tragedy of the commons, to building a financial system fit for purpose, or shaping the future of work to tackling climate change, it is becoming increasingly clear that the current system is incapable of addressing the interlinked crises of environmental unsustainability, economic instability, and social inequality.

There are a number of emerging approaches that offer insights into how an economy could operate differently, but we urgently need an inspiring public narrative that outlines how an economy that delivers economic wellbeing for all within environmental limits would work – and the intellectual thinking that is necessary to get to this point.

The Source network identifies issues and looks for tipping points where systemic change can be created. By collaborating with campaigners and policy makers, Source aims to support the development of an economy that delivers economic wellbeing for all within environmental limits.

The network brings together in one place a diverse range of inspirational voices from the worlds of academia, civil society, and grassroots organisations. This platform provides an online space for discussion and constructive debate, but it is also a meeting point to forge new working collaborations across Europe. The Source platform also provides members with the opportunity to exchange information about relevant activities, initiatives, and events taking place all over Europe, and to build key relationships with new research partners.

Source’s approach is summarised as follows

Align – Source has created an online community of academics, policy professionals and civil society organisers committed to systemic change. Although diversity is actively pursued and valued, so is the fact that all those in the network share the view that transforming the economy for planet and people is critical and to be achieved requires an organised systemic approach. In this way we will be more effective at developing proposals and actions that tackle the big, interconnected economic, environmental and social challenges we face today.
Generate cultural debate – Economic transformation always involves raising big moral questions about how the economy operates and our aim is no different. Every month the network identifies issues and looks for tipping points where systemic change can be created. Discussions are hosted via the network’s online platform giving every member the opportunity to be involved, and to exchange thoughts with leading academics, policy professionals and civil society organisers.
Take a systemic approach – Focusing on short-term impacts and running issue-based campaigns will always be important but to deliver far-reaching change then on its own it is simply not enough. Following each online debate, a Briefing Paper will synthesize the findings of the online discussion, aiming at outlining the current economic system’s dysfunctionalities. The Briefing Paper informs the formulation of a Base Research Paper, which develops and shares the alternative solutions and supporting evidence. Collectively, this series of research papers will form the building blocks of a new economic narrative that is shaped by all participants.

By collaborating with campaigners, academics, policy makers, and other civil society organisations, Source acts as a catalyst and aims to:

Demonstrate that an alternative exists: Theories and reasoned argument have an important role to play but critically so does making things real. Source supports the development of pan-European initiatives by collaborating with progressive civil society organisations across Europe;
Organise: Just because more research is being done, campaigns being run and local initiatives developed does mean necessarily that something bigger is being achieved. Strategy wins and the aim of transformational change demands requires strategy and alignment. by collaborating with campaigners, Source develops toolkits and materials to support civil society groups committed to systemic change;
Popularise the transformation: If we do not make the systemic approach and the big moral questions relevant to people we will not see the transformation we are aiming for. Source will collaborate with media partners from across Europe to disseminate and promote its proposals;
Achieve policy impact: Source ultimately aims to influence the policy process at the local, national and European levels by collaborating with policy makers and policy professionals all across Europe.

If you are interested in joining Source, please visit www.sourcenetwork.org, or get in touch with Federico Guerrieri, federico.guerrieri@neweconomics.org

Federico Guerrieri is European Co-ordinator at the New Economics Foundation

The Spanish Elections 26J: an incomplete transformation

July 13, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

In this post, Ricard Gomà reflects on the implications of the Spanish general election held on June 26, 2016. Ricard is professor of political science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and has also had a distinguished career in Spanish and Catalan politics. He is a member of ‘Barcelona en Comú’, former municipal leader of ‘Iniciativa per Catalunya’ and was the Secretary of Social Welfare (2003-2007) and Deputy Mayor of Social Action and Citizenship (2007-2011) of the City Council of Barcelona. The post was originally written in Spanish and translated by CURA’s Adrian Bua.

The Spanish general elections of the 26^th June (26 J) ended a cycle that began just over two years ago. The European elections of May 2014 heralded the political expression of a new era, which has now settled . The social movement that began in Spain on the 15^th March 2011 (15M – also known as the “indignados”) forged a new dynamic that questioned establishment politics, its corruption and unjust ‘austericide’. From where I am writing, in Catalonia, this converged with the mass mobilization in favour of the right for self-determination. But the movement moved beyond the area of such reactive forms of civic protest. The 2014 European elections marked the emergence of Podemos as a device that channelled the demands and the political culture, in the broadest sense, of 15M into our formal democratic institutions. The municipal elections of the 24^th May 2015 marked another major breakthrough. In those elections, the alliance between social movements, civic platforms and political parties in favour of change broke through to gain governing majorities in Spain’s major cities – including Madrid and Barcelona. This was an unprecedented victory for transformative forces. For example, in Catalonia, Ada Colau, a prominent leader of the anti-eviction movement becomes mayor of the Capital, Barcelona, shortly followed by the formation of a nationalist majority in the regional parliament.

Following these developments, delivering the end of bipartisanship in Spain stood out at the next challenge for the new political forces. They delivered on this. The general election of the 20^th December (20D) and (following the political stalemate and inability to form a government) its re-run on 26J, made bipartisanship history in Spain. It is notable that this has not occurred – as in the case of many other European Countries – because of the emergence of a xenophobic right wing populism. It is because the political vehicle for change, “Unidos Podemos” with regional confluences in Catalonia, Valencia, Baleares and Galicia, has achieved more than 5 million votes and 71 parliamentary representatives, almost on a par with the Socialist Party – something that was unthinkable only two years ago. The change of scenery is remarkable because it signifies a transition from the social to the political, from the fragmented to the convergent, and because of its progressive orientation, calling for more democracy and a more open society, as a strategy for renewal and response to the crisis. It is perhaps un unparalleled development, that may also still be full of fruit to bear.

However, the results of the 26J point to more immediate concerns which we should not ignore. On the one hand, the “Partido Popular” (PP – the Spanish conservatives that have governed since 2011, despite the direct implication of prominent local and national actors in major corruption scandals that have unravelled during this time), not only keeps winning elections, but has increased its share of the vote since 20D. Moreover, the expectations of Unidos Podemos and the regional confluences to surpass the PSOE were not met, and 1 million votes were lost between 20D and 26J. I will not try here to develop explanations, but will offer two reflections on the significance of the result, and one final thought.

First, the electoral result of 26J has negated the possibility to “take heaven by assault” (i.e. “tomar el cielo por as alto”) – a popular argument that identified a historic window of opportunity to take over political power through a political and electoral tsunami. Spanish bipartisanship remains in crisis, but it has not collapsed. Achieving 71 parliamentary seats is an important milestone, but they will have to deliver their potential within a steadier and decelerated political timeframe, that has more in common with a “drizzle” than a “tsunami”. It will have to weave complex social solidarities, and work within the existing institutional framework without losing the political culture that engendered it.

Second, 26J teaches us that the old political forces also have significant resources to draw on in the realm of emotional politics. At the end of the day, their appeal to fear beat the politics of hope. Fear of change and its uncertainties trumped the discomfort generated by corruption. ‘Unidos Podemos’ and its allies did not make substantive public policy alternatives the central focus of their campaign – perhaps because they thought this terrain was too complicated. And it might have been – the decision to base the campaign on the politics of emotions might have been the correct one, although it did not deliver victory. As such, the 71 seats and the aforementioned dynamics of social alliance building, should also develop substantive policy policy agenda. In this way, credibility can be established, and support won, as a viable alternative government that can deliver a concrete transformation in people’s lives, and overcome the immorality of injustice and the indecency of corruption.

Finally, the “new municipalism” made up of a network of cities for change, must continue to demonstrate that the transformation of everyday life in cities is possible. It will also have to strengthen its symbolic dimension as a spearhead of the yet to come – of ethics and humanity as the new grammar of politics. But it will face a hostile state that implies limits, and contextual obstacles to strategies for change. Local governments should be aware of all this: of the game of difficulties and potentialities; the need to establish popular support to confront state hostility; and to do what is necessary continue rebuilding basic rights and hopes for the future.

Ricard Gomà is the current Director of the Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona (IERMB). He is professor in Political Science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) and research fellow at the Institute for Government and Public Policy (IGOP). He was the Secretary of Social Welfare (2003-2007) and Deputy Mayor of Social Action and Citizenship (2007-2011) of the City Council of Barcelona, is a member of Barcelona en Comu and former municipal leader of ‘Iniciativa per Catalunya’.

This post was originally written in Spanish and translated by Adrian Bua – the original article is copied below.

Las elecciones generales del pasado 26 de junio cierran en España un ciclo que se inició hace poco más de dos años, con las elecciones europeas de mayo de 2014. Ha sido el ciclo de expresión política del cambio de época. Y no se acaba nada, más bien se asientan las bases de lo nuevo. El 15M de 2011 se fraguó una corriente social de fondo que cuestionaba las viejas formas de hacer política, sus tramas de corrupción y su austericidio injusto. Aquí en Cataluña, esa corriente coexistía con la movilización masiva por el “derecho a decidir”. El malestar social podía haberse estancado ahí, en la esfera de la denuncia ciudadana reactiva. Pero no se quedó en eso. Las elecciones europeas de 2014 marcan la irrupción de Podemos como dispositivo de canalización política de la cultura 15M, en sentido amplio. El gran avance se produce en las elecciones municipales del 24 de mayo de 2015. En esos comicios, las candidaturas de confluencia entre movimientos ciudadanos y actores políticos del cambio consigue ya no sólo irrumpir sinó ganar en las grandes ciudades, con Barcelona y Madrid a la cabeza. Lo emergente, el conjunto de las fuerzas transformadoras consigue una victoria electoral sin precedentes. En la capital catalana, una activista antideshaucios se convierte en alcaldesa. Poco despues, se configura una amplia mayoría soberanista en el Parlamento de Cataluña. Faltaba por producirse un cambio importante: el fin del bipartidismo en España. Pues bien, tras el 20D y su réplica el pasado 26 de junio, el bipartidismo ya es historia. Y no porque haya emergido –como en muchos paises europeos- una derecha populista y xenófoba, sinó porque el vehículo político del cambio -la suma de la coalición Unidos Podemos con las confluencias territoriales en Cataluña, País Valenciano, Baleares y Galicia- ha conseguido más de 5 millones de votos y situar 71 diputad@s en el Congreso, casi a la par con el partido socialista, algo impensable hace sólo dos años. Es extraordinario el cambio de paisaje: lo es por haber transitado de lo social a lo político; de lo fragmentado a lo confluyente. Y lo es por su orientación progresista, de más democracia en una sociedad más abierta, como respuesta a la crisis y como orientación estratégica de un tiempo nuevo. Es un escenario quizás sin parangón; quizás también cargado de potencialidades aún por desplegar.

Pero más allá de la mirada larga, las elecciones del 26 de junio nos proporcionan también otras señales que no deberíamos ignorar. Por una parte, el PP no sólo sigue ganando elecciones sinó que incrementa el nivel de voto en relación al 20D. Por otra parte, las expectativas de Unidos Podemos y las confluencias no sólo no se cumplen, sinó que se dejan un millón de votos por el camino en sólo 6 meses. No se trata ahora de proponer posibles explicaciones, peró sí aportar algunas reflexiones a partir de los resultados; dos en concreto. Y una consideración final.

En primer lugar, el resultado del 26J da por superada la tesis de la ventana de oportunidad histórica para intentar “tomar el cielo por asalto”, a partir de una lógica de tsunami político-electoral. El régimen bipartidista sale tocado, en plena crisis, pero no hay colapso. Los 71 escaños de las fuerzas del cambio son un hito y pueden dar para mucho, pero tendrán que desplegar su potencial en un esquema de tiempos políticos ralentizados: construyendo una dinámica más cercana a la “lluvia fina” que al “tsunami”, tejiendo complicidades sociales, y trabajando en el marco institucional sin perder los elementos culturales de la nueva política. En segundo lugar, el resultado del 26J nos enseña que en el terreno de las emociones, las fuerzas de la vieja política tienen también recursos importantes que les permiten jugar y ganar. El recurso emocional al miedo ha ganado a la sonrisa, a la esperanza. El miedo al cambio, a sus incertidumbres, se ha impuesto al malestar que genera la corrupción. Unidos Podemos y las confluencias no plantearon una campaña en el campo programático, de los contenidos, de las alternativas de política pública. Pensaron que quizás ese era un tablero demasiado complicado. Tal vez lo era. Y tal vez la opción por disputar la batalla en la política emocional, en la política del relato como estrategia fuese acertada. En todo caso no ha sido ganadora. Y por tanto los 71 escaños –y las dinámicas de articulación social que antes mencionaba- deberan tejer también un terreno de política sustantiva: ganar credibilidad y apoyo como alternativa creible de gobierno, de transformación concreta de las condiciones de vida materiales de la gente, de superación viable de injusticias inmorales y corrupciones indecentes.

Finalmente, la red de ciudades por el cambio, el nuevo municipalismo, deberá seguir demostrando que la transformación cotidiana de las ciudades es posible, y tendrá que fortalecer su dimensión simbólica, de punta de lanza de lo nuevo, de la ética y la humanidad como gramática de la política. Pero se enfrentará a un poder estatal hostil. Y eso plantea también límites. Plantea obstáculos de fondo a las estrategias del cambio. Los gobiernos locales deberán ser conscientes de todo ello: del juego de potencialidades y dificultades; de la necesidad de fortalecer complicidades ciudadanas para hacer frente a hostilidades estatales; de lo imprescindible de seguir reconstruyendo derechos básicos y esperanzas de futuro.

Ricard Gomà es profesor de ciencias políticas en la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, miembro de Barcelona en Comú, ex líder municipal de ‘ Iniciativa per Catalunya ‘ en Barcelona, Secretario de Bienestar Social (2003-2007) y el vicealcalde de Acción Social y Ciudadanía (2007-2011 ) del Ayuntamiento de Barcelona.

Austerity Urbanism – Scotland Style?

June 23, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

In today’s post Annette Hastings discusses ‘austerity urbanism’ in the Scottish context.

It’s hard to counter the view that contemporary austerity is being realised to a large extent in and through what is happening in cities. Jamie Peck developed the ‘austerity urbanism’ thesis to explain the dimensions and significance of austerity in US cities. He argued – in a nutshell – that in the US some of the worst impacts of austerity were targeted on city governments and that, by targeting cities, austerity was effectively being targeted on the most vulnerable. Recent research suggests that the thesis developed for the US, holds for England. It confirms that the unprecedented cuts to local government budgets have impacted most heavily on poor cities. It also suggests that despite the intention of many city governments to shelter the poor and marginalised from the worst effects of austerity cuts, that cuts were beginning to harm the services relied on these groups – such as housing, social care, social work and advice services. The work also showed that it was poorer people and places that suffered more when cuts were made to the ‘universal’ services used by the broader population such as libraries, leisure centres and street cleansing.

But does austerity urbanism hold in Scotland? To the same degree? In the same kind of ways? Anti-austerity rhetoric and a sense of resistance is palpable in Scotland. It comes from politicians, from urban managers, from the mainstream media and from citizens and civil society. But does this lead to a distinctive austerity urbanism – Scotland style? Some differences do stand out.

The Scottish Government has had less of a tendency than its Westminster counterpart to try to protect some public services while sacrificing others to the worst of austerity cuts. So whereas in England, local government has been subjected to much higher rates of cut than some other services such as Health, giving flesh to the austerity urbanism thesis, in Scotland cuts have been shared more equally across public services. While Scottish councils have experienced big reductions in what they have to spend on key services – an 11% real terms reduction between 2011 and 2015 (which equates to about £100 per head of population) – this is not as severe a picture as in England, where the reduction was on average about twice as big. However, this sense of protection in Scottish local government relative to England has now come to an end, with a much more severe local government settlement in place for the current financial year – with Glasgow City Council, for example, facing a real terms cut of over £63million, and Edinburgh and other urban councils implementing cuts of £30million and more.

The targeting of poor cities for grant cuts has not been as stark in Scotland as in England either. Poorer councils have lost a little bit more than better off ones and, like England, there is a post-industrial and urban skew to cuts, but in Scotland these patterns are more to do with population loss than the policy design. It is important to note though that historically in Scotland, the deprivation premium built into the local government finance system to compensate more disadvantaged councils for higher levels of need was historically less generous in Scotland than in England. That situation has been reversed since the onset of austerity.

But despite these differences, it is also clear is that austerity in Scotland has been harsher than it needed to be. Since 1999, the Scottish Parliament has had the power to vary the rate of income tax by 3p in the pound – a power which has never been used despite the anti-austerity rhetoric of successive Scottish Governments. Moreover, a new Scottish Rate of Income Tax has been in place since April 2016, giving the Scottish Parliament even more capacity to vary levels of income tax. In early 2016, the SNP Government proposed (and had agreed) a Budget in which a clear commitment not to vary income tax levels was made, a position maintained in their Party’s manifesto in the recent May 2016 Scottish Parliamentary elections. And the ‘winners’ of these elections, the SNP alongside a resurgent Scottish Conservative Party, stood alone amongst mainstream parties during the election campaign in that they did not argue for increased personal tax rates to ‘pay for public services’ . This would suggest that it is not only in Scottish polity that the desire to counter austerity agendas with increased taxation is controversial, but that this agenda is also controversial with the Scottish public.

So yes, we can perhaps detect some ‘Scottish style’ aspects of austerity urbanism, but the extent to which these differences are durable and more than rhetorical is debatable.

Annette Hastings is Professor of Urban Studies at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow

Social exclusion and labour rights in the banlieues of Paris: Part II

April 14, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

In this blog, originally published by SPERI, CURAs Heather Connolly writes the second part of her blog series on social exclusion in Paris, and explains how trade union support for undocumented migrant workers is taking place in an atmosphere of growing stigmatisation and social tension.

Last month I returned to the banlieues of Paris on a research visit hosted by CRESPPA-CSU, four months after the November attacks, and during the week of the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22^nd March. Whilst in Paris issues of social division and community cohesion inevitably dominated political debates and press headlines.

Anecdotally, reaction in the mainstream media in France in the days after the Brussels attacks suggested a lack of recognition of French immigration history and the citizenship status of ethnic minorities from the banlieues. Calls were made by some members of the public to send the terrorists, many of whom had French or Belgian nationality, ‘back home’. This sentiment has been somewhat fuelled by François Hollande’s proposals, as a direct response to the November 2015 attacks, to make controversial changes to the constitution to strip militants convicted of terror attacks of their French nationality (proposals which have now been dropped).

Other important contextualising factors feeding political debates and public perceptions around immigration and social exclusion include the current and emerging tensions surrounding the migrant and refugee crises in Europe, and restrictions of movement and increased police powers as a result of France’scontinuing ‘state of emergency’ (état d’urgence).

As was the case in the Paris attacks, the terrorists in Belgium grew up in the suburbs of Brussels, with high levels of unemployment, particularly amongst second and third generation youths of immigrant origin.

Immigration flows to France are often linked into debates on models of integration and patterns of social exclusion of migrants. France’s assimilationist model has in many ways failed in relation to the integration of past flows of immigrants. As a result second and third generations of immigrant origin find it difficult to access employment and often remain trapped in the banlieues of Paris.

I was in Paris to follow up on my research on trade union responses to immigrants and those known as thesans papiers (undocumented workers) (which Part I of this blog explored), and found a somewhat depressing picture emerging. Immigrants and especially the sans papiers are increasingly being stigmatised and placed under restrictions while trying to live and work in France. This situation isn’t being helped by the current political debates mentioned above.

Signs initially looked better for the sans papiers when in 2012 the circulaire de regularisation, which sets out guidance and defined sets of conditions for administrators processing regularisation claims was introduced in response to growing unrest among sans papiers workers. Trade unions, particularly the CGT, have been an important resource for the sans papiers in fighting for criteria for regularisation and in making sure they are applied, even though the circulaire has no legal status and doesn’t give automatic rights to work permits. The strategy seems to be working and since 2010 the union has obtained some 10,000 regularisations of migrants.

At the same time there have been increasing sanctions on employers found to be employing undocumented migrants, with two circulaires in 2013 against illegal work and against irregular immigration. Also, there are some who are critical of the circulaire de regularisation, claiming that there have been fewer regularisations per year since its introduction. During last month’s field work with my French colleague Dr Sylvie Contrepois, one undocumented Senegalese worker, who had found regular work in France for 24 years, suddenly found himself without work as a result of the greater restrictions on employers, and without recourse to any rights to unemployment benefit or state aid.

The CGT, one of the largest French trade unions has provided a ‘permanence’ (advice service) for the sans papiers in the banlieues of Paris since 2014. The union has between 70 and 80 sans papiers attending the ‘permanence’ every week with the aim being to help the migrants to obtain work permits, and the immediate aim to protect them from having problems with employers and the police.

The advice given to the sans papiers demonstrates the uneasy nature of accessing labour rights as an undocumented worker in France. One Senegalese union activist we spoke to (still a sans papier himself) explained that many of the migrants did not understand the process of accessing their rights in France. There were heated exchanges between the sans papiers and the union activists advising the migrants, with some suggesting that it was particularly the Bangladeshi migrants who weren’t so aware of the process for obtaining papers. In asking what the process was we discovered that it was important first to obtain fake papers, then find a job, stay in that job for a certain amount of time, collect some pay slips and then come to the union, who would then be able to help with their case for a work permit. The union was able to draw on the conditions set out in circulaire de regularisation to make the case for regularisation, even where workers were working with fake papers.

By offering a service to undocumented workers, in spite of its service-based appearance, the union aims to identify and call out poor employer practices and force them to apply regulations. The broader political goal is to fight illegal work, prevent social dumping and to encourage self-organising and future mobilisations of sans papiers. The union also hopes for the greater integration and involvement of thesans papiers within the wider union. Whether trade unions are able to build and sustain this kind of solidarity and action remains a key challenge, but an important one in such uncertain times.

Dr Heather Connolly is Senior Lecturer in Leicester Business School at De Montfort University, and a member of CURA

The austerity-security symbiosis

February 24, 2016June 15, 2017vguarn01

There are different ways in which austerity and security come hand in hand in contemporary political affairs. Three examples include Greece’s financial crisis and the socio-economic and political insecurity generated from the ideological disputes on whether to carry on with neoliberal driven polices promoted by the Troika; the British austerity narrative promoted by the Conservatives alongside policies and bills preventing terrorism (i.e. Government’s Draft Investigatory Power Bill) and narratives of human rights which, while aiming to provide an environment of welfare and wellbeing for all, tend to be driven by mechanisms that authorise state actors to use force and repression (i.e. housing eviction officers) on the one hand, and to facilitate (or control) citizen participation initiatives (i.e. neighbourhood renewal partnerships in the UK and the US or citizen security programmes across Latin America where police are a key partner on the other.

I argue that security and austerity are two different narratives whose convergence has consolidated in the 21^st century. Their symbiosis cuts across different dimensions of analysis: from the macro to the micro level and from the remote sphere of the global financial system to the concrete sphere of people’s daily lives. We cannot assert that one depends on the other in a unidirectional way. Instead, they feed into one another and they reinforce and benefit from one another. Three premises help me to explain this symbiosis.

I will borrow the phrase by Owen Worth to explain the first premise: austerity as a defence of neoliberalism. This premise sets the foundation of power differences between the powerful (protector) and vulnerable (in need of protection), which are implicit in the relationships developed behind any understanding of security. This premise has been helpful to insert fear of the social instability that a fiscal/financial crisis may bring about, especially if irresponsible public or private debt is not restrained. The 2015 elections in Greece to stay in or out of the European Union or the Cameron-Osborne decision to incur in policies of fiscal austerity (low taxation and budget cuts, followed by an accentuated retreat of state services) are good examples that portray that if austerity is not pursued chaos, collapse and disorder will rule society instead. Therefore, austerity becomes a weapon to defend the middle and lower-income groups of the population from the undesired consequences of a fiscal/financial crisis that if untackled, in a later stage, contributes to political and social anxiety -as people begin to fear losing their jobs, savings, and welfare support (which they lose anyway)- while encountering protests and social revolts that increase perceptions of insecurity.

The second premise states that ‘austerity needs of security’; it derives from debates on the legacies of authoritarianism co-existing alongside neoliberalisation. The Latin American case is a good example to develop this point. In the 1980s, after neoliberal economic reforms were introduced in the region (characterised initially by a long-term fiscal austerity period), several governments began losing legitimacy as the safety nets that the state provided to specific sections of the population (i.e. trade unions or peasant confederations) began to withdraw. As a result, protests, dissident groups and social mobilisations emerged throughout the region. The governments, who introduced neoliberal economic reforms, responded through violence and repression by using tactics of the authoritarian past to maintain social control and national security. Thirty years afterwards, the term ‘neoliberal authoritarianism’ has cropped up to describe the political state of affairs of two of the region’s economic powers – Brazil and Mexico: nepotism and impunity, collusion with transnational corporations and violation of human rights by state armed forces and police (in many cases these abuses are carried out in the name of security over the fight against drug-trafficking). To this scenario, a new wave of fiscal austerity hitting the region since autumn 2015 has to be factored in. It is too early to tell the extent to which security tactics will fare, but it is indeed an arena that deserves attention. Its contrast with Europe is of equal interest given that governments have tended to enhance repressive and invasive strategies as austerity becomes normalised.

Finally, the third premise contends that the ‘development of security narratives need their austerity counterpart’. It derives from the academic work by Bourdieusian scholars who argue that neoliberal policies do not only repress, but also recreate repression through mundane, daily living practices carried out by both governmental and non-governmental actors. Applied to contexts in western Europe and the Americas, narratives of security are formed by a continuous investment (or co-investment with businesses) in penalisation (i.e. respect of the rule of law, development of penitentiary-probation systems and of armed forces and police), while traditional welfare policies retreat and new ones contribute to deepening flexibility and individual responsibility across the population, in particular addressing the poor. Through the promotion of different forms of work (in the formal or informal economy; as an employee or self-employed) citizens have to learn to provide for themselves (housing, education, leisure). This gradual self-provision requires security measures to ensure that social order is maintained. Security takes a multi-varied form that may range from omnipresent surveillance systems to the management of unintended effects of individualisation and privatisation, such as vigilante groups (which state actors either aim to supress or reintegrate into the system to regain social control).

Dr Valeria Guarneros-Meza is a core member of the CURA team as well as Lecturer in Public Policy at the Department of Politics and Public Policy at DMU.

The Justin Trudeau Brand of Photogenic Austerity

February 1, 2016June 15, 2017abuaro01

This week’s guest contributor John Clarke argues that the Liberal Party and Justin Trudeau’s recent electoral victory in Canada is not one to be celebrated by the anti-austerity left. Rather than pursue alternative policies, we can expect the new Canadian Government to ‘stealthily’ pursue the Austerity agenda and continue a raft of reactionary policies implemented by the Conservative Harper administration.

Having replaced the crudely reactionary and rather charmless Stephen Harper as Canadian Prime Minister, the photogenic Justin Trudeau is being presented in the media as a breath of fresh air. However, millions of working class and poor people, impacted by an intensifying austerity agenda, have grievances that will not be solved with sound bites and selfies.

Unlike the UK, where the Liberal Party went into decline in the first part of the 20^th Century, its counterpart in Canada has remained a front rank political formation up to the present day. With social democracy here playing very much less of a role, the Liberal Party has taken turns in governing with the Conservatives over generations. It is often said of the Liberals that they ‘campaign from the left and govern from the right’. In these times of mounting austerity, this becomes truer than ever. Trudeau won the election by beating back an upsurge of support for the New Democratic Party (NDP). He did this by outflanking the decidedly Blairite NDP leadership on the left. While there leader, Thomas Mulcair, vowed to be tougher than the Tories on the deficit, Trudeau adopted a Keynesian mantle and proposed limited deficit financing to stimulate the economy.

This electoral ruse was not without irony, given that it was employed by the Liberal Party. In 1993, austerity at the federal level in Canada, took an unprecedented leap forward at the hands of the Liberal Chretien Government. Social housing was downloaded onto the provincial governments, transfer payments to the provinces were cut massively and the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) was eliminated. This had provided federal money for provincial income support systems for the unemployed and disabled, while setting national standards for these programmes. The impact of the destruction of CAP has been enormously regressive.

There is no serious possibility that the present Trudeau Government will implement serious reforms such as a national housing programme, improvements in income support systems or reverse the decline in health care standards unless they are faced with a very serious social movement that fights for such things. In fact, the crisis that sparked post 2008 international hyper austerity, seems to be deepening in Canada to a deeply troubling degree. The significantly resource based economy has been hard hit by the fall in oil prices. The downtown is centred in but by no means confined to the western province of Alberta, where unemployment has skyrocketed and food banks are being overwhelmed. Moreover, as the economy slumps, Canada has a dangerous household debt level that is the highest among G7 countries. None of this suggests any great prospects for the Liberals rediscovering their former and very dubious progressive credentials.

Since taking power, the Trudeau regime has taken care to overturn some particularly egregious measures the Harper Tories had undertaken. Harper, for example, had tried to prevent Muslim women from taking the oath of Canadian citizenship if they wore a niqab. When the courts struck down this hideous requirement, the Tories launched an appeal. Trudeau was only too happy to ostentatiously kill that appeal and ‘celebrate diversity’ at no cost. On the more decisive question of the austerity agenda’s close relative, endless war, the Liberals have been somewhat less progressive. Harper’s shameful $15 billion arms deal with the Saudi Arabian torture state will not be cancelled and armoured vehicles, perfectly suited to murdering protesters on the streets, will be delivered as planned. The election pledge to end Canadian airstrikes in Syria and Iraq has not only been broken but the killing and devastation has actually been intensified. When it comes to the implementation of austerity measures, we may expect the Trudeau Government to act more stealthily that the former Tory regime but to maintain and even intensify its regressive course.

The federal system of government in Canada makes the implementation of austerity a more collaborative effort. Some direct federal social programmes do exist, such as unemployment insurance and the Canada Pension Plan, but for the most part, social provision is in the hands of the provinces. The federal government can cut funding but not directly implement regressive policies. If Iain Duncan Smith lived in Canada, he’d have to impose his Work Capability Assessments on the sick and disabled in one of the ten provinces. However, the Liberal Party is at work on the austerity project in a number of Canadian jurisdictions. In Quebec, the government of Philippe Couillard is forging ahead with unprecedented austerity measures in the face of a huge social mobilisation. Public services and the workers that deliver them are under enormous attack. Despite being a Liberal, Couillard has proudly acknowledged that his greatest political role model is none other than Margaret Thatcher.

In Ontario, the Liberals have been in power since 2003. They took over from a hard right wing Tory regime and have craftily consolidated and deepened the austerity measures they inherited. They are an object lesson in the role of the Liberal Party as a kind of political chameleon. The present leader, Kathleen Wynne, took over the job claiming she would be the ‘Social Justice Premier’. Since 1994, social assistance payments to unemployed and disabled people in Ontario have lost at least 55% of their spending power. This decline continued after the Liberals came to power and despite the fact that they passed a Poverty Reduction Act that they have violated by making people poorer.

The austerity agenda in Canada will be ‘kinder and gentler’ under Trudeau and his Liberal provincial counterparts only in form but not in substance. We are really dealing with austerity in sheep’s clothing. The contradiction in dealing with such duplicitous regimes is that they are less hard-nosed and can be forced to retreat somewhat more easily than overtly right wing governments but, at the same time, they are far more skillful in the art of political demobilisation. Dialogue and consultation are their stock in trade. It may, however, be Justin Trudeau’s misfortune to have taken on the role of Prime Minister at a time when the intensity of the austerity agenda and the social resistance it engenders will more than his charm and photogenic qualities can deflect. Unlike David Cameron, the present Canadian Prime Minister would never stand up in the House of Commons and refer to people in a squalid refugee camp as ‘a bunch of migrants’. His brand of austerity, however, is every bit a vicious and harmful as Cameron’s and those impacted by have just as much reason to mobilise and fight back as do people in the UK.

John Clarke is a political activist based in Canada, and founding member of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty. He writes regularly on political and economic issues.