From Surge to Sensation: Corbynism and the Unexpected Renaissance of the British Left

CURA director Professor JonathJeremy_Corbyn_speaking_at_the_Labour_Party_General_Election_Launch_2017an Davies reflects on the implications of June’s general election result for the socialist left in the UK.

When Jeremy Corbyn was first elected in 2015, I argued that he would only be able to resist the establishment backlash, especially from his own perfidious MPs, if he could make the surge that propelled him to the Labour leadership infectious. When Theresa May called the General Election on 18th April 2017, there was precious little sign of this happening. Labour was polling in the 20s; the Tories seemed on course for a landslide and the left set for a historic defeat. The renaissance between then and the election of 8th June is staggering and of historic proportions. Corbyn’s election campaign, a simple left wing manifesto, mass rallies, positive media exposure and an appeal rooted in his quiet sense of personal authenticity, has transformed the prospects for the left in Britain.  The Corbyn surge has indeed become infectious.  In the process, it has shattered several myths.

It first shatters the myth of “unelectability” peddled by critics from the now-contrite Owen Jones rightwards. If a Corbyn led Labour Party can achieve more than 40%, only a month after polling 28%, there does not seem to be any inherent barrier to it winning 45% or 50% of the vote. Corbyn’s success is performative: as a Guardian columnist put it, “the more plausible he looks, the more support he will gather“.  This insight was borne out by an initial post-election Survation poll, showing Labour now in a 6% lead. Moreover, even before the surge got going Corbyn was more popular, not only than the toxic figure of Tony Blair, but also Ed Miliband, former leadership rival Yvette Cooper and Mayor of London Sadiq Khan. The takeaway lesson from the election is simple: a left wing candidate can win on a left wing manifesto.

Second, and relatedly, the Corbyn campaign shatters the self-serving establishment delusion that we have entered an age of “post-truth” politics, where emotion and belief hold sway over reason and fact. Academia is notorious for making epochs out of fads, and “post-truth” politics is a case in point. Corbyn and Bernie Sanders in the USA both tap into a fervent sense of possibility. There is a craving for authenticity, the hope that sincerely held beliefs can be rendered factual and truthful on the ground: that ordinary people can once again exercise influence, if not mastery, in the political world.

It thirdly shatters another self-serving establishment myth: that young people won’t vote. It rather confirms that abstention was not due to “apathy”, but reasonable and reasoned “antipathy”, or alienation. For decades, the mainstream political parties had nothing to offer people demoralised or repelled by neoliberal groupthink.  For a long time, there has been good in-depth research refuting the theory of “apathy”, ignored by psephologists and pundits (e.g. Marsh, O’Toole and Jones, 2007). The reprehensible Tory claim that Corbyn bribed younger people to vote for ‘free stuff’ is further refuted by evidence showing tuition fees were by no means top of their list of concerns.  Nonetheless, Corbynism resurrects the idea that  “free stuff” funded from progressive taxation is precisely the mark of a decent society and that burdening young people with £80 billion in tuition fee debt was a national disgrace.

Fourth, it shatters the conveniently anti-working class myth that Brexit and UKIP voters are one-dimensional racists. At the start of the election, it seemed that UKIP had done its job and the Tories were set to clean up in former Labour heartlands. To be sure, a large number of working class UKIP votes did go to the Tories, but many were convinced to vote Labour.  Surely, then, more still can be won back. It is worth recalling that until Cameron called his referendum, EU membership was a non-issue. A year later it seems to be a non-issue once again. To the consternation of both Leavers and Remainers, Brexit did not dominate the election. In good part thanks to the Corbyn campaign, nor did immigration. Ideological and everyday racism remains a huge issue in British politics and society. The Leave vote unleashed an appalling wave of hate crimes, as did the recent terror attacks in Manchester and London.  Yet, Labour’s campaign on an optimistic anti-austerity, pro-public services platform has begun to change the narrative on both immigration and security. Given an alternative upbeat political focus, fear of foreigners began to slip down the list of voter concerns.

A fifth myth, now shattered, is that a supine and impotent left could do nothing about Brexit but seek to retain membership of the “single market” described by New Labour spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, as “Mrs Thatcher’s greatest achievement”. To cling to the single market under current rules is effectively to say that corporate interests must always dictate how the British economy is run.  Arch-Brexit Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan pointed out that “several trade union and Labour figures, including some Remainers, now see Brexit as an opportunity to withdraw from EU rules that hamper the nationalisation of industries, and encourage contracting out of public services to private firms”. During the EU referendum campaign, this so-called #Lexit position – for a left wing Brexit – was dismissed as fantasy politics, even by committed socialists. Today, it does not appear quite so fanciful. Labour will undoubtedly have to take a clearer position if it enters government and set out the economic and political parameters of what a progressive Brexit, including the idea of a “reformed” single market, might look like. The defence and extension of free movement remains an inviolable principle for the internationalist left, an issue Labour has fudged. But whatever this position might be, the left is now in a position to influence the debate.

What of the broader significance of the Corbyn surge? I have long been wary of using the word “crisis” to describe the drearily routine politics of the UK under austerity. While there has been enormous suffering for which the term “social crisis” is apt, in politics “crisis” is meant to convey a sense of upheaval conspicuously missing for much of David Cameron’s “age of austerity” (see Bayırbağ, Davies and Münch, 2017). However, in winning over nearly 13 million people, Corbyn may have provoked an incipient full-blown crisis of the British state, something that appeared until recently to have been averted in the aftermath of Brexit. This is partly a crisis of political legitimacy.  The prospect of a weak and divided Tory government propped up by the Democratic Unionist Party, a pre-historically bigoted organisation whose culture and politics are alien to the vast majority of Britons, looks like a recipe for instability and strife.  It is also partly, at last, a political crisis of neoliberalism. This is the authoritarian “free market” doctrine that Britain’s politicians managed to resuscitate after the 2008/9 economic crisis. Presented with an intelligible non-UKIP alternative to the debilitating free market austerity consensus, people were very quickly persuaded and voted for it. Most importantly this is, and has the potential to further become, a crisis of hegemony in which the left in all its forms can fight with renewed confidence for socialist alternatives.  A new wave of anti-austerity struggles is one possibility, linked to the refusal of Tory hard Brexit logics – notably Mrs May’s threat to turn Britain into an offshore tax haven.

From the standpoint of austerity, the revival of the British left through the improbable vehicle of Corbyn’s Labour Party is thus a cause for optimism.  But it certainly is not cause for complacency. Whether the notoriously fractious British left can seize the moment remains to be seen. Little has yet been won and the British ruling class in both its economic and political guises is a formidably ruthless force. The neoliberal Blairite wing is already on manoeuvres. In the Mail on Sunday, Peter Mandelson called for “moderate” Labour MPs to stand by Theresa May, provided she takes a more flexible approach. He enjoined that “mainstream Labour MPs, who worry about the impact of the continuing Corbyn revolution on centrist voters, should be prepared to stand by the wounded PM, and likewise she should welcome their approach in the national interest”. If nothing else, this shocking intervention lays bare the extraordinary lengths to which the Blairite right will go to sabotage the left. On the electoral front, voting preferences are extremely fluid. Since the 2015 election, a working class Labour voter might have migrated from Ed Miliband to UKIP via Brexit and then to the Tories, only to be won back at the last minute by Jeremy Corbyn. This fluidity shows that Labour can no longer rely on traditional working class affiliations: it can only win through building and sustaining political credibility. Nor should we overestimate the influence of socialist ideas. Moreover the battles Corbyn faced as Labour leader seem trivial compared with what he would endure as a socialist prime minster, presiding over an ailing 21st Century British capitalism – potentially severed from its European markets.

But with these necessary warnings this is, at last, a time for optimism among anti-austerity forces and the left. The new politics fits very well with our core research priority in CURA, to explore the parameters and potentialities of the emancipatory city. As his enormous election rallies attest the Corbyn surge is, if nothing else, an urban movement anchored in Britain’s cities. If it is to progress further, with the age of austerity finally brought to a close, urban politics will be crucial.

Jonathan Davies is Professor of Critical Policy Studies and Director of the Centre for Urban Research on Austerity at De Montfort University.

Looking (and thinking and acting) beyond Brexit

CURA’s Adam Fishwick offers his thoughts on Brexit, in response to Jonathan Davies’s previous post.

Brexit can only be understood as a victory for the Right. The Leave campaign was no anti-establishment revolt. Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, Ian Duncan Smith, Nigel Farage, Rupert Murdoch – for all their posturing in standing up to the bureaucrats in Brussels or confronting the entrenched political elites of Westminster, represent nothing more than a nastier, more virulent, more insidious strain of that which they outwardly claim to be confronting.

But there is an anger at the established political and economic forces that occupy the institutions that govern us. As stated by Jonathan Davies, the marginalisation, fragmentation, and ongoing immiseration of many in the UK (and across Europe) is the real issue facing us today – and it is here that there has been, and continues to be, a real revolt.

The Right have succeeded in making this into a narrow nationalist, anti-immigration, and oftentimes racist response to the deepening impact of neoliberal policies and practices that are the real cause of the vast inequities of wealth and power around us. Mobilising all too familiar tropes against those outside and appealing to a nationalist rhetoric that offers little of substance but harks back to a vague, semi-existent past has filled the symbolic gap left by the retreat of social democracy into the comforts of the political power and institutional prestige.

Worryingly we are already seeing the emboldening of the far Right through this discourse. Some of the early congratulations for Brexit came from Marie Le Pen, Geert Wilders, the AfD, and the Northern League and the recent presence of groups like Britain First in Leicester in the previous weeks show the comfort such groups have found in this campaign.

The answer to this, however, does not come from a decrying of the ‘false consciousness’ of the working class or to anger at their betrayal on the part of those supposed to represent an alternative vision that they have clearly long abandoned. In The Communist Hypothesis, Alain Badiou argues that such pronouncements provide an inadequate and counter-productive starting point for confronting the entrenched relations of power that have led us to this point and which are continuing to set the course as we begin to move beyond Brexit.

So, perhaps instead, it is time to embrace the emerging new contentious politics and to replicate a break with what Badiou called “the set of parliamentary political personnel that proclaim that they are the only ones equipped to bear the general consequences of a singular political movement” (149). And to do this there is a pressing need to articulate and begin to embody a vision beyond austerity and beyond neoliberalism, political forms that lie at the heart of the wider disenfranchisement and marginalisation seized upon by Brexit. From post-work utopias to horizontalist political spaces and experiments, some of the work in envisioning and constructing new political forms has been started already, but there remains much more to be done and a much longer struggle ahead.

Dr Adam Fishwick is Lecturer in Urban Studies and Public Policy and a member of Centre for Urban Research on Austerity at De Montfort University

Disability and the Bedroom Tax: Discretionary Payments Violate Statutory Rights

The Guardian reported today that the Appeal Court have ruled the Bedroom Tax unlawful with respect to two cases – a victim of domestic violence “A”, and a severely disabled teenager, Warren Todd.   The outcome is an important stepping-stone in the campaign against the Bedroom Tax, but the government has been given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Bedroom Tax is a benefit sanction against those deemed by the Department of Work and Pensions to have a spare bedroom. Those affected have either to move to a smaller property, face housing benefit deductions or rely on a local authority subsidy to make up the difference. There have been a number of cases of disabled people being threatened with the loss of their homes. In the case of Warren Todd, the DWP argued that his family’s challenge to the Bedroom Tax on grounds of discrimination lacked credibility, because local authorities can make Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs) to anyone sanctioned if they see merit in the case. An earlier High Court ruling accepted this logic, finding that the responsible authority, Pembrokeshire County Council, had covered the rental shortfall through a DHP, and there was no evidence to suggest it would stop doing so in future.

The reasons for the Court of Appeal decision are not yet completely clear – it ruled that the Secretary of State had failed to justify “admitted discrimination”. However, the ruling does suggest that the argument over DHPs is vitally important. Does the UK Government have a duty to recognize the rights of disabled people, or can it be left to the “discretion” of local authorities? How, logically, can a “discretionary” payment be construed as upholding statutory rights of disabled people not to suffer discrimination?

It is plainly wrong in principle to suggest – as the High Court did – that statutory rights can ever be upheld on a “discretionary” basis. Moreover, the High Court ruling ignored two important facts about DHPs, highlighted by our ESRC funded austerity research. First, there is no guarantee from Government that discretionary grants to help councils manage the transition to new benefit regimes will be retained long-term – local officials certainly think of them as bridging funds. Second, we know that some authorities attach conditions to DHP, meaning that a “spare room” is subsidized only if the recipient shows willing to move to a smaller property. The bedroom tax remains a looming threat for anyone in these circumstances.

DHPs cannot substitute for statutory rights in theory, and our research shows that they cannot do so in practice either. The Court of Appeal appears to recognize this, and if the government launches a challenge, disability rights in this country will depend on the Supreme Court upholding its eminently sensible ruling.

Professor Jonathan Davies is Director of the Centre for the Urban Research on Austerity

 

The Autumn Spending Review: A Political but not an Economic Fix?

After the Government’s spending review on 25th November, I was struck by how experienced political commentators were fumbling to get a grip on the detail of its plans and forecasts. What lies beneath the headlines and soundbytes will become clear with time, but some general contours and contradictions are already emerging from the Chancellor’s “smoke and mirrors”.

The headlines will say that George Osborne reversed controversial proposals to cut tax credits – a U-turn for which shadow Chancellor John McDonnell quickly claimed credit for the Labour Party. But, they have not been reversed for people on the new Universal Credit system – a reform critics see as a serious benefits cut in itself. Moreover, tax credits will remain frozen and diminish in value. Osborne devolved some control over elements of local government finance, but with multiple strings attached. Council tax rises are permissible, but must be ring-fenced to adult care. Business rate rises are permissible, and local authorities will retain the returns. However, additional rate levies will depend on the consent of local business elites. Councils will have the same to spend in “cash terms” in 2020 as they do now. This announcement foreshadows major public service reductions, but on a scale impossible to anticipate without knowing other volatile variables in advance. The government, and councils, are investing hope in the integration of health and adult social care as a way of delivering austerity without outright retrenchment. Yet according to Lord Porter, Chair of the Local Government Association, a new round of cuts is likely to push councils to the edge of collapse. Osborne has spoken frequently of Britain moving from high welfare-high tax to a high wage-low welfare economy, predicated on increases to the minimum wage. Yet, an hourly living wage is only a real living wage for people working enough hours in the week to surpass income poverty thresholds. It will not be a living wage for those on part-time or zero hours contracts – or those in precarious self-employment.

Whatever the merits and drawbacks of specific cuts and measures, the holy grail of Osborne’s Chancellorship is delivering a budget surplus in 2020. The Office for Budget Responsibility suggested he will be boosted by an unexpected increase in tax receipts through the middle of this parliament, a claim immediately qualified by Chairman Robert Chote. Even if he enjoys good fortune with the tax receipt numbers, Osborne faces formidable barriers. Responding to the spending review, John McDonnell was quick to remind us of the Chancellor’s poor forecasting record. In 2010, the government said it would eliminate the budget deficit by 2015. Now, we are told this will occur in 2020. With the support of the Labour Party, the media and much of the public, the last government set a welfare-spending cap. Today, we were told the cap has been breached and will not be met until 2019. Ultimately, all depends on forecasts for sustained GDP growth at rates of 2.3 or 2.4% for each of the next five years. But such a stable pattern would be exceptional. In the best-case scenario, GDP growth will fluctuate in an upward direction. In the worst-case scenario, underlying weaknesses in the economic recovery will soon trigger another recession.

In short, it is plausible that before long, the government will have to revise its forecasts again and come back for more. If a budget surplus remains the primary goal of British economic policy, further attrition of the welfare state and corrosion of the public realm is the price we will be asked to pay. Even then, the goal could be elusive.

Jonathan Davies – Director, Centre for Urban Research on Austerity

After The Corbyn Surge

The election of Jeremy Corbyn to the Labour Party leadership is a seismic event in British politics – perhaps even more so than the SNP landslide in May 2015. For the first time, a committed socialist and anti-austerity activist leads the Labour Party at Westminster.  Many commentators were busy writing his obituary long before he became leader. Yet, serious thinkers on the right aren’t fooled. They know Corbyn taps into a popular mood, the desire for authentic opposition to the Tories, and an alternative to the right wing populism of UKIP. They fear that he really could threaten the enervating austerity consensus.  Making that threat a reality is his only chance.

Corbyn faces formidable opponents in the state, business, media and the Labour machine itself.  Can he survive as leader?  Is it remotely plausible that he could become PM?  It will be extraordinarily difficult, but it is possible whatever the psephologists might say.  Politics can change. Political activists can be agents of change.  The challenge, simply, is to make the “Corbyn surge” infectious: translate his campaigning energies to the national stage and use his position as Labour Leader to win credibility for his socialist worldview. In practice, that means he must mobilise a movement capable of stopping austerity in its tracks. To win credibility, the Corbynistas must find a way of making austerity ungovernable. Accomplish that, and they might regain credibility for socialist politics and bring millions of working class people alienated by the Blairite era back into the political and electoral fold.  Since Corbyn’s astonishing victory on Saturday, there have been stirrings within the leadership of the trade union movement – even threats of “civil disobedience”.  But we heard all that in the heady days of 2011. At the height of the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street movement, we saw a trade union demonstration of more than half a million people in London, and mass strikes against cuts in public sector pensions. But the unions backed down and nothing came of it. Talking a good fight against austerity isn’t remotely the same as delivering. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership is a huge gamble and the odds are stacked against him. If the Corbyn surge does not prove to be infectious, he will quickly be toast.  But by sticking his guns he could just lead a renaissance on the left and transform British politics.

We will be discussing this and many other issues at the inaugural conference of our Centre for Urban Research on Austerity on 18th and 19th November 2015. See http://www.dmu.ac.uk/CURA2015.

Jonathan Davies

Director – Centre for Urban Research on Austerity

Collaborative Governance under Austerity: an 8 Case Comparison

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CURA’s first research project is Collaborative Governance under Austerity: An eight-Case comparative Study, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. The project will run from April 2015 to September 2017 and is exploring austerity governance in eight cities: Athens, Baltimore, Barcelona, Dublin, Leicester, Melbourne, Montreal and Nantes.

For emergent findings see here, and for more information the project here, and here