Author: abuaro01

SOURCE: A Network for Change

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In this post Federico Guerrieri introduces SOURCE, an online network coordinated by the New Economics Foundation, that is designed to catalyse collaboration between academics, policy professionals and civil society organisers from across Europe committed to tackling the biggest economic, environmental and social challenges we face today.

From solving the tragedy of the commons, to building a financial system fit for purpose, or shaping the future of work to tackling climate change, it is becoming increasingly clear that the current system is incapable of addressing the interlinked crises of environmental unsustainability, economic instability, and social inequality.

There are a number of emerging approaches that offer insights into how an economy could operate differently, but we urgently need an inspiring public narrative that outlines how an economy that delivers economic wellbeing for all within environmental limits would work – and the intellectual thinking that is necessary to get to this point.

The Source network identifies issues and looks for tipping points where systemic change can be created. By collaborating with campaigners and policy makers, Source aims to support the development of an economy that delivers economic wellbeing for all within environmental limits.

The network brings together in one place a diverse range of inspirational voices from the worlds of academia, civil society, and grassroots organisations. This platform provides an online space for discussion and constructive debate, but it is also a meeting point to forge new working collaborations across Europe. The Source platform also provides members with the opportunity to exchange information about relevant activities, initiatives, and events taking place all over Europe, and to build key relationships with new research partners.

Source’s approach is summarised as follows

  • Align – Source has created an online community of academics, policy professionals and civil society organisers committed to systemic change. Although diversity is actively pursued and valued, so is the fact that all those in the network share the view that transforming the economy for planet and people is critical and to be achieved requires an organised systemic approach. In this way we will be more effective at developing proposals and actions that tackle the big, interconnected economic, environmental and social challenges we face today.
  • Generate cultural debate – Economic transformation always involves raising big moral questions about how the economy operates and our aim is no different. Every month the network identifies issues and looks for tipping points where systemic change can be created. Discussions are hosted via the network’s online platform giving every member the opportunity to be involved, and to exchange thoughts with leading academics, policy professionals and civil society organisers.
  • Take a systemic approach – Focusing on short-term impacts and running issue-based campaigns will always be important but to deliver far-reaching change then on its own it is simply not enough. Following each online debate, a Briefing Paper will synthesize the findings of the online discussion, aiming at outlining the current economic system’s dysfunctionalities. The Briefing Paper informs the formulation of a Base Research Paper, which develops and shares the alternative solutions and supporting evidence. Collectively, this series of research papers will form the building blocks of a new economic narrative that is shaped by all participants.

By collaborating with campaigners, academics, policy makers, and other civil society organisations, Source acts as a catalyst and aims to:

  • Demonstrate that an alternative exists: Theories and reasoned argument have an important role to play but critically so does making things real. Source supports the development of pan-European initiatives by collaborating with progressive civil society organisations across Europe;
  • Organise: Just because more research is being done, campaigns being run and local initiatives developed does mean necessarily that something bigger is being achieved. Strategy wins and the aim of transformational change demands requires strategy and alignment. by collaborating with campaigners, Source develops toolkits and materials to support civil society groups committed to systemic change;
  • Popularise the transformation: If we do not make the systemic approach and the big moral questions relevant to people we will not see the transformation we are aiming for. Source will collaborate with media partners from across Europe to disseminate and promote its proposals;
  • Achieve policy impact: Source ultimately aims to influence the policy process at the local, national and European levels by collaborating with policy makers and policy professionals all across Europe.

If you are interested in joining Source, please visit www.sourcenetwork.org, or get in touch with Federico Guerrieri, federico.guerrieri@neweconomics.org

Federico Guerrieri is European Co-ordinator at the New Economics Foundation

Devolution after Brexit: 3 things that need to change

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In this post, originally published on the New Economics Foundation’s blog, Adrian Bua argues that devolution should deliver a genuinely more equal, decentralised and balanced political economy in the UK following the Brexit vote.

Brexit has cast doubt over much of UK economic policy – including the Treasury’s pledged support for a ‘devolution revolution’.

Many areas that voted in favour of Brexit were those left behind by a decline in British industry since the late 1970s and those suffering the most from government spending cuts.

They’re the areas that need effective devolution the most, but they’re also the areas standing to lose the most from a Brexit.

Uncertainty has already hit the manufacturing sector with Siemensdeciding to halt investment in Hull, and it won’t be the last case of its kind. Decisions like this will affect poorer regions disproportionately as their industry is generally more dependent on EU demand.

Moreover, these regions have also benefitted the most from EU regional development funding – and therefore stand to lose the most as these funds are discontinued, especially if the British state decides not to compensate the losses.

All this means that poorer regions will suffer from short term disruption and uncertainty, but it does not mean that such regions won’t benefit from Brexit in the long term. For example, supporters of Brexit such as James Wharton, the Minister for local growth and the Northern Powerhouse, say northern businesses now have a huge opportunity to “go global”.

We are concerned however, that rather than leading to a more balanced economy, Brexit risks turning Britain into a full-on ‘hedge-fund economy’ that works for already global finance firms and the City of London.

It’s therefore even more important that the government changes its currently-flawed approach to devolution in the following ways:

1. An industrial strategy for the whole of the UK

The Brexit vote was a loud complaint by those left behind by what Colin Hay has called the ‘Anglo-Liberal’ growth model based on London’s financial services, spending fuelled by private credit and housing price bubbles. This also brought with it the decimation of our public and social services.

We need a new industrial strategy and a plan for regeneration that will boost the incomes and opportunities of these alienated communities that have been left behind.

2. More power to the people

The above, which would include some redistribution of wealth, needs to be accompanied by the redistribution of power.

As Tony Hockley argues, more money and investment can’t reverse the cultural elements of inequality, highlighted brilliantly by Lisa McKenzie’s work on the stigmatisation of working class neighbourhoods in Nottingham, for example.

To tackle this appropriately, as well as offering opportunities for excluded communities to benefit from growth, we need to enable such communities to take an active role in our society and economy. Approaches to ‘Community Economic Development’ such as that being carried out in Preston in their experiment with co-operative industry, have much potential in this respect.

By combining economic development, with the empowerment of citizens, communities can become ‘development makers’, rather than ‘development takers’.

Devolved areas should also engage citizens in forms of participatory public administration, by implementing meaningful and genuine forms co-production in public services, and developing more ambitious approaches to participatory budgeting to give genuine control to people over public investment in their areas.

3. More democratic politics

Our politics also needs to be more responsive to people and the decentralisation of political power needs to occur in political parties and through the electoral system.

Decay in these key democratic institutions is part of what Colin Crouch terms ‘post-democracy’, a condition which I argue elsewhere underpinned many of the pathologies surrounding the EU referendum.

All political parties need a bottom up reinvention based on greater democracy.

How do we do this?

Current attempts by the Labour party to rediscover its roots in social movements are welcome, as are remarks by incoming Prime Minister and Conservative leader Theresa May about a country that works for everyone.

A more proportional electoral system that allowed for a greater plurality of political parties, that could experiment with different organisational models and offer a greater variety of policy platforms without engaging in distracting internal struggles would also be welcome.

Adrian Bua is researcher at the New Economics Foundation and at the Centre for Urban Research on Austerity

Follow the Protest: Exploring the Limits and Torsions of Collaborative Governance in Nantes

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In this post Steven Griggs, David Howarth and Andrés Feandeiro  report the findings from the exploratory research in Nantes, carried out as part of the collaborative governance under austerity project, sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council as part of its Urban Transformations Network, and led by Prof. Jonathan Davies.

Referendum watchers in June 2016 may have been rightly fixated on the Brexit vote, which led to the people of the United Kingdom choosing to leave the European Union. But there was another referendum that took place just three days later, even if its political legitimacy as a referendum or consultation was more open to question. On Sunday June 26, in the French department of Loire Atlantique, local citizens voted on whether to give a green light to the construction of a new international airport at Notre-Dame-des-Landes. The new airport, some 20 kilometres to the north-west of Nantes, would replace the existing Nantes Atlantique airport.

Roughly half of the electorate turned out to vote (51.08 per cent) in the referendum, with a little over 55 per cent of the local residents (55.17 per cent) voting in favour of the construction of the new airport. However, this overall victory masks a fragmented electorate, with villages and towns close to the proposed site for the new airport voting against the project. In the city of Nantes itself, opponents and supporters of the new airport were divided by only 100 votes, with the ‘yes’ vote winning just 50.05 per cent of the share of the vote.

Plans to build a new airport were first mooted in the 1960s. They dropped off the political agenda in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis. But they reappeared in the early 2000s, driven in part by the lobbying of the then Mayor of Nantes, Jean-Marc Ayrault, and his particular brand of urban boosterism. Renewed interest in the airport also served to re-ignite opposition to the proposed development. Campaigners brought together farmers, local residents, politicians, and environmental activists, thus giving a voice to a counter-expertise throughout the legal and planning processes, while drawing in support from across France and Europe. Protesters set up camps and took over vacant compulsory-purchased farms on the proposed site of the airport, transforming the government purchased ‘zone to develop’ into the ‘zone to defend’, where they pursued alternative forms of social organisation. Indeed, their expulsion from the proposed site in 2012 attracted national and international media attention as protesters clashed with riot police.

What, if anything, does this mean for the study of austerity and collaboration in Nantes? At first glance, it may appear that this story of the airport development operates outside of – or parallel to – the everyday practices of governance in the city. After all, it is, despite claims to the contrary, a national infrastructure project, which is subject to national planning practices. Indeed, the decision to hold a referendum was presented as an initiative of François Hollande, the French president. Here, however, we argue that the construction of the airport has come to act as a symbolic issue for protest and contestation across the city of Nantes. It has brought together a broad coalition of groups and campaigns, and poses a challenge to the dominant model of collaborative governance and the Nantes project of urban regeneration and economic boosterism. In other words, it has (potentially) come to define the very limits of collaborative governance and the Nantes model of participatory engagement.

Nantes has arguably not suffered the vagaries of austerity associated with other cities in France. The city continues to attract people and investment; it has reasserted its status as the capital of the west of France, transforming its workforce in the process. Since the closure of its shipyards in the 1980s, the city has been associated with a series of urban renewal initiatives, for example the development of its tram system, the regeneration of the Malakoff neighbourhood and the Ile de Nantes. Successive municipal leaders, not least Jean-Marc Ayrault, have sought to position Nantes at the forefront of European cities, developing its international reputation and attractiveness for its practices of innovation, culture and the environment. In 2015, Nantes was the European Green Capital.

This is not to deny the existence of deprivation across many neighbourhoods of the city. One of the key challenges facing politicians and policymakers in Nantes, repeatedly expressed in interviews, is the increasing number of people in various communities who were deemed to be at risk of falling off the back of the economic growth motor of Nantes. Yet, this risk of social exclusion was not constructed by local officials as a simple consequence of austerity. Budgetary constraints were clearly recognized. But viewed against the backdrop of a city that continues to grow and broaden its local tax base, Nantes was seen as facing a triple crisis. Economic constraints were interwoven with political challenges, as French citizens turn away from traditional politics, and social challenges were discerned in the form of the weakening of established community networks; all of which have prompted demands for new forms of service delivery and governance.

Much of the policy and political response to this triple crisis comes firmly under the rubric of collaborative governance. On the one hand, Nantes has embraced inter-communal collaboration, which has led to the sharing and coordinating of services with its local municipal partners in the inter-communal organisation that is Nantes Métropole. Nantes has indeed become one of the new metropolitan areas recently established by the French state. On the other hand, Nantes city council has invested markedly in moves towards citizen dialogue and co-governance. Like many other developments, this tradition within the city dates back at least to the mayoral term of Jean-Marc Ayrault. But it has become the defining policy commitment of the current Mayor Johanna Rolland. Indeed, building on its neighbourhood forums across the new urban space, the city has engaged in a number of ‘big conversations’, most notably its nine-month consultation on the management of the Loire river, which flows through the city and its region.

However, what are the limits of this collaborative governance in addressing this triple crisis? To answer this question, let us return to the plan to build an international airport at Notre-Dame-des-Landes. In many ways, this issue has become a mobilising or “nodal” issue for a number of demands against both national and local policies, in which protesters against the airport have also contested the dominant narrative of urban boosterism which has underpinned the official discourses of Nantes. At the end of February 2016, demonstrators against the new airport linked the campaign against the airport to a number of adjacent grievances and demands.

Such articulations were captured in a statement from Christine Poupin, one of the national leaders of the New AntiCapitalist  Party, who participating at the February 2016 anti-airport protest in Nantes claimed that ‘there is a moment when it becomes necessary to say “STOP” … STOP to the airport obviously, but also STOP to its world, and its world is the same as that as the state of emergency as that of the destruction of the employment law…’ Students protesting in Nantes against the reform of labour rights made similar equivalences between struggles, with the regional newspaper, Ouest-France reporting: ‘they shout against police violence, the airport, capitalism, government, bosses.’. Indeed, the project at Notre-Dame-des-Landes has come to be seen as an ‘ideological battle’, in which there is a challenge both to the entire growth model, which many commentators have suggested is a key motif of the Nantes project, and to the very legitimacy of the French state. As expected, the referendum, which François Hollande publicly constructed as putting an end once and for all to debate over the airport has clearly failed to do so.  Local residents have vowed to continue their campaign, with judicial reviews still in place over environmental impacts of the planned infrastructure on water and on rare species. Moreover, as we suggested above, protesters on the ZAD, the renamed  ‘zone to defend’, which covers the proposed airport site, have established their own camps; they have built spaces in which to develop and showcase new ways of living, as well as exhibiting new forms of relationships. They are also preparing to defend another attempt to evict them forcibly from the site.

Such protests and campaigns, coupled with the painful creation of alternative spaces, evoke the limits of new forms of collaborative governance, while exposing various techniques and forms of depoliticisation. The latter might be seen as endeavours to exclude potential alternatives to the current regimes and models of governance under the guise of ‘pragmatic politics’ and the reaching of a rational consensus. Our intuition in this regard is that certain forms of protest and alienation may be rendered invisible or displaced by the dominant discourse of integration and community cohesion (as was arguably the case in the UK as part of the Third Way discourse). It is also possible in this regard that the local and national media focus on the overt and intense protests against the building of a new international airport in Nantes may serve unwittingly to conceal other sets of underlying tensions and cleavages. The protests against the airport have been largely spearheaded by middle-class environmentalists, peasants and anarchists, whereas the troubled neighbourhoods affected by the financial crisis tend to reflect class and ethnic divisions. By ‘following the protest’, while remaining attentive to the way in which ‘political resistance discloses the true operation of power’, our future fieldwork will focus on these related issues.

Steven Griggs is Professor of Public Policy at De Montfort University, David Howarth is Professor in Social and Political Theory at the University of Essex, and Dr. Andrés Feandeiro is a research assistant on the Collaborative Governance under Austerity project at De Montfort University.

Governing Austerity in Melbourne

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In this post Hayley Henderson, Brendan Gleeson and Helen Sullivan report the findings from the exploratory research in Melbourne, carried out as part of the collaborative governance under austerity project, sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council as part of its Urban Transformations Network, and led by Prof. Jonathan Davies.

Melbourne is the capital city of the state of Victoria and the second most populous city in Australia, with a current population of 4.5 million spread over more than 9,900 square km. The sprawling metropolis is governed via a multi-level system of centralised state and dispersed and diverse local government. Our research focuses on The City of Greater Dandenong a significant municipal region 30kms southeast of the Melbourne CBD and home to a major regeneration initiative ‘Revitalising Central Dandenong’ (RCD 2005-25). RCD is emblematic of the kind of ‘place-based’ targeted interventions led by governments in Australian and other developed economy cities in the last two decades. It affords the opportunity to situate strategies and practices suggestive of contemporary ‘collaborative governance’ in time and space to illustrate and help explain their particular character.

Traditionally a seat of industrial activity, Dandenong experienced sectoral economic decline in recent years with the long run contraction of Australian manufacturing.  However, strong plural migration furthered the community economy, or at least its prospects in the context of significant disadvantage, as an array of migrant communities asserted a stake in the area’s commercial, retail and property sectors.

Initiated under a state Labor administration in 2005 RCD brought multiple actors from State and local governments together formally and funded a program of work on common goals over a long-term period to combat structural issues of disadvantage.  The project commenced with an unprecedented investment in a single urban renewal site of AUS$290 million.  This investment supported land acquisition, staff costs and infrastructure delivery over the first five years of the project life.  It leveraged both considerable private investment in development (the aim is for a 1:10 public to private ratio in investment) as well as local government spending of approximately AUS$120 million in complementary improvement projects.

The preliminary findings from the Melbourne case study suggests that the central concepts ‘collaborative governance’ and ‘austerity’ are problematic in the Australian (and especially Melbourne) context.

The idea of collaborative governance has limited purchase amongst practitioners; rather the idea of ‘integrated planning.’ is preferred. This may reflect the distinct spheres that urban planners and scholars inhabit in contrast to their public policy colleagues – a distinction that does not necessarily apply solely to Australia. It is also likely a product of a particular interpretation of ‘collaborative governance’ as the shared rule of interdependent actors from all sectors. This does not resonate in a context where state governments and their agencies dominate in terms of resource power, and where municipalities have (or are perceived to have) limited capacity to act as assertive collaborative entities in contexts that invite or demand the ‘joining up’ of policy settings.

Collaborative activity abounds however, across policy areas and between different sectoral actors. RCD is characterised in almost entirely collaborative terms with repeated references to relationship-building, community-building, formal ‘cross-government’ structures and processes, ‘partnerships’ with non-government entities and informal strategies for effecting change in a multi-actor context.  Informality is key here. Where structures are deemed to be weak or lacking, actors and their practices are deemed to be able to make things work.

The concept of ‘austerity’ is also rather alien to Australian urban policy discourse. Austerity is not a label generally used to describe or conceptualise public fiscal cutbacks, constraints or institutional change (e.g. corporatisation, privatisation).  Rather a more episodic language of ‘crisis’ is evident from 2000s, used to frame and rationalise specific instances of what might be regarded as austerity governance.  Here too though the political rhetoric is rarely matched by the real material crises visited upon other cities and countries in recent decades. What is notable is the ongoing use of the rhetoric of a ‘migrant crisis’ to create a sense of othering amongst local communities. This can have material consequences for plural localities such as Dandenong.

It is the case that fiscal conservatism is the dominant political trope for both major national (and state) political blocs. This political trend towards restraint in public revenue and expenditure over the last 15 years (and earlier) is a persistent theme, frequently evidenced in expenditure cutbacks in specific areas and reductions of institutional effort and capacity. Even so this political aspiration has been more honoured in the breach, with expenditure and revenue across all levels of government at historically high levels throughout the 2000s.

Our case study examines an urban renewal episode that extended through Labor and Liberal-National state administrations.  Amongst other things, our early findings show how Labor state governments are prepared to undertake intensive urban investments and interventions without departing necessarily from the general narrative of fiscal restraint.  Commitment to integrated planning appears, inter alia, to be a means to maintain the uneasy balancing of these twin commitments – intervention and restraint – by aiming to enhance policy effectiveness and efficiency through strategic, place-based interventions. Under conservative rule, this tension is relaxed and fiscal minimalism is coupled to voluntaristic collaborative policy efforts.

Hayley Henderson is a PhD canditate in Urban Planning, Brendan Gleeson Professor of Urban Policy Studies and Professor Helen Sullivan director of the Melbourne School of Government at the University of Melbourne, Australia.

The Spanish Elections 26J: an incomplete transformation

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In this post, Ricard Gomà reflects on the implications of the Spanish general election held on June 26, 2016. Ricard is professor of political science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and has also had a distinguished career in Spanish and Catalan politics. He is a member of  ‘Barcelona en ​​Comú’, ​​former municipal leader of ‘Iniciativa per Catalunya’ and was the Secretary of Social Welfare (2003-2007) and Deputy Mayor of Social Action and Citizenship (2007-2011) of the City Council of Barcelona. The post was originally written in Spanish and translated by CURA’s Adrian Bua.

The Spanish general elections of the 26th June (26 J) ended a cycle that began just over two years ago. The European elections of May 2014 heralded the political expression of a new era, which has now settled . The social movement that began in Spain on the 15th March 2011 (15M – also known as the “indignados”) forged a new dynamic that questioned establishment politics, its corruption and unjust ‘austericide’.  From where I am writing, in Catalonia, this converged with the mass mobilization in favour of the right for self-determination. But the movement moved beyond the area of such reactive forms of civic protest. The 2014 European elections marked the emergence of Podemos as a device that channelled the demands and the political culture, in the broadest sense, of 15M into our formal democratic institutions. The municipal elections of the 24th May 2015 marked another major breakthrough. In those elections, the alliance between social movements, civic platforms and political parties in favour of change broke through to gain governing majorities in Spain’s major cities – including Madrid and Barcelona. This was an unprecedented victory for transformative forces. For example, in Catalonia, Ada Colau, a prominent leader of the anti-eviction movement becomes mayor of the Capital, Barcelona, shortly followed by the formation of a nationalist majority in the regional parliament.

Following these developments, delivering the end of bipartisanship in Spain stood out at the next challenge for the new political forces. They delivered on this. The general election of the 20th December (20D) and (following the political stalemate and inability to form a government) its re-run on 26J, made bipartisanship history in Spain. It is notable that this has not occurred – as in the case of many other European Countries – because of the emergence of a xenophobic right wing populism. It is because the political vehicle for change, “Unidos Podemos” with regional confluences in Catalonia, Valencia, Baleares and Galicia, has achieved more than 5 million votes and 71 parliamentary representatives, almost on a par with the Socialist Party – something that was unthinkable only two years ago. The change of scenery is remarkable because it signifies a transition from the social to the political, from the fragmented to the convergent, and because of its progressive orientation, calling for more democracy and a more open society, as a strategy for renewal and response to the crisis. It is perhaps un unparalleled development, that may also still be full of fruit to bear.

However, the results of the 26J point to more immediate concerns which we should not ignore. On the one hand, the “Partido Popular” (PP – the Spanish conservatives that have governed since 2011, despite the direct implication of prominent local and national actors in major corruption scandals that have unravelled during this time), not only keeps winning elections, but has increased its share of the vote since 20D. Moreover, the expectations of Unidos Podemos and the regional confluences to surpass the PSOE were not met, and 1 million votes were lost between 20D and 26J. I will not try here to develop explanations, but will offer two reflections on the significance of the result, and one final thought.

First, the electoral result of 26J has negated the possibility to “take heaven by assault” (i.e. “tomar el cielo por as alto”) – a popular argument that identified a historic window of opportunity to take over political power through a political and electoral tsunami. Spanish bipartisanship remains in crisis, but it has not collapsed. Achieving 71 parliamentary seats is an important milestone, but they will have to deliver their potential within a steadier and decelerated political timeframe, that has more in common with a “drizzle” than a “tsunami”. It will have to weave complex social solidarities, and work within the existing institutional framework without losing the political culture that engendered it.

Second, 26J teaches us that the old political forces also have significant resources to draw on in the realm of emotional politics. At the end of the day, their appeal to fear beat the politics of hope. Fear of change and its uncertainties trumped the discomfort generated by corruption. ‘Unidos Podemos’ and its allies did not make substantive public policy alternatives the central focus of their campaign – perhaps because they thought this terrain was too complicated. And it might have been – the decision to base the campaign on the politics of emotions might have been the correct one, although it did not deliver victory. As such, the 71 seats and the aforementioned dynamics of social alliance building, should also develop substantive policy policy agenda. In this way, credibility can be established, and support won, as a viable alternative government that can deliver a concrete transformation in people’s lives, and overcome the immorality of injustice and the indecency of corruption.

Finally, the “new municipalism” made up of a network of cities for change, must continue to demonstrate that the transformation of everyday life in cities is possible. It will also have to strengthen its symbolic dimension as a spearhead of the yet to come – of ethics and humanity as the new grammar of politics. But it will face a hostile state that implies limits, and contextual obstacles to strategies for change.  Local governments should be aware of all this: of  the game of difficulties and potentialities; the need to establish popular support to confront state hostility; and to do what is necessary continue rebuilding basic rights and hopes for the future.

Ricard Gomà is the current Director of the Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona (IERMB). He is professor in Political Science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) and research fellow at the Institute for Government and Public Policy (IGOP). He was the Secretary of Social Welfare (2003-2007) and Deputy Mayor of Social Action and Citizenship (2007-2011) of the City Council of Barcelona, is a member of Barcelona en Comu and former municipal leader of ‘Iniciativa per Catalunya’.

This post was originally written in Spanish and translated by Adrian Bua – the original article is copied below.

Las elecciones generales del pasado 26 de junio cierran en España un ciclo que se inició hace poco más de dos años, con las elecciones europeas de mayo de 2014. Ha sido el ciclo de expresión política del cambio de época. Y no se acaba nada, más bien se asientan las bases de lo nuevo. El 15M de 2011 se fraguó una corriente social de fondo que cuestionaba las viejas formas de hacer política, sus tramas de corrupción y su austericidio injusto. Aquí en Cataluña, esa corriente coexistía con la movilización masiva por el “derecho a decidir”.  El malestar social podía haberse estancado ahí, en la esfera de la denuncia ciudadana reactiva. Pero no se quedó en eso. Las elecciones europeas de 2014 marcan la irrupción de Podemos como dispositivo de canalización política de la cultura 15M, en sentido amplio. El gran avance se produce en las elecciones municipales del 24 de mayo de 2015. En esos comicios, las candidaturas de confluencia entre movimientos ciudadanos y actores políticos del cambio consigue ya no sólo irrumpir sinó ganar en las grandes ciudades, con Barcelona y Madrid a la cabeza. Lo emergente, el conjunto de las fuerzas transformadoras consigue una victoria electoral sin precedentes. En la capital catalana, una activista antideshaucios se convierte en alcaldesa. Poco despues, se configura una amplia mayoría soberanista en el Parlamento de Cataluña. Faltaba por producirse un cambio importante: el fin del bipartidismo en España.  Pues bien, tras el 20D y su réplica el pasado 26 de junio, el bipartidismo ya es historia. Y no porque haya emergido –como en muchos paises europeos- una derecha populista y xenófoba, sinó porque el vehículo político del cambio -la suma de la coalición Unidos Podemos con las confluencias territoriales en Cataluña, País Valenciano, Baleares y Galicia- ha conseguido más de 5 millones de votos y situar 71 diputad@s en el Congreso, casi a la par con el partido socialista, algo impensable hace sólo dos años. Es extraordinario el cambio de paisaje: lo es por haber transitado de lo social a lo político; de lo fragmentado a lo confluyente. Y lo es por su orientación progresista, de más democracia en una sociedad más abierta, como respuesta a la crisis y como orientación estratégica de un  tiempo nuevo. Es un escenario quizás sin parangón; quizás también cargado de potencialidades aún por desplegar.

Pero más allá de la mirada larga, las elecciones del 26 de junio nos proporcionan también otras señales que no deberíamos ignorar. Por una parte, el PP no sólo sigue ganando elecciones sinó que incrementa el nivel de voto en relación al 20D. Por otra parte, las expectativas de Unidos Podemos y las confluencias no sólo no se cumplen, sinó que se dejan un millón de votos por el camino en sólo 6 meses. No se trata ahora de proponer posibles explicaciones, peró sí aportar algunas reflexiones a partir de los resultados; dos en concreto. Y una consideración final.

En primer lugar, el resultado del 26J da por superada la tesis de la ventana de oportunidad histórica para intentar “tomar el cielo por asalto”, a partir de una lógica de tsunami político-electoral. El régimen bipartidista sale tocado, en plena crisis, pero no hay colapso. Los 71 escaños de las fuerzas del cambio son un hito y pueden dar para mucho, pero tendrán que desplegar su potencial en un esquema de tiempos políticos ralentizados: construyendo una dinámica más cercana a la “lluvia fina” que al “tsunami”, tejiendo complicidades sociales, y trabajando en el marco institucional sin perder los elementos culturales de la nueva política. En segundo lugar, el resultado del 26J nos enseña que en el terreno de las emociones,  las fuerzas de la vieja política tienen también recursos importantes que les permiten jugar y ganar. El recurso emocional al miedo ha ganado a la sonrisa, a la esperanza. El miedo al cambio, a sus incertidumbres, se ha impuesto al malestar que genera la corrupción. Unidos Podemos y las confluencias no plantearon una campaña en el campo programático, de los contenidos, de las alternativas de política pública. Pensaron que quizás ese era un tablero demasiado complicado. Tal vez lo era. Y tal vez la opción por disputar la batalla en la política emocional, en la política del relato como estrategia fuese acertada. En todo caso no ha sido ganadora. Y por tanto los 71 escaños –y las dinámicas de articulación social que antes mencionaba- deberan tejer también un terreno de política sustantiva: ganar credibilidad y apoyo como alternativa creible de gobierno, de transformación concreta de las condiciones de vida materiales de la gente, de superación viable de injusticias inmorales y corrupciones indecentes.

Finalmente, la red de ciudades por el cambio, el nuevo municipalismo, deberá seguir demostrando que la transformación  cotidiana de las ciudades es posible, y tendrá que fortalecer su dimensión simbólica, de punta de lanza de lo nuevo, de la ética y la humanidad como gramática de la política. Pero se enfrentará a un poder estatal hostil. Y eso plantea también límites. Plantea obstáculos de fondo a las estrategias del cambio. Los gobiernos locales deberán ser conscientes de todo ello: del juego de potencialidades y dificultades; de la necesidad de fortalecer complicidades ciudadanas para hacer frente a hostilidades estatales; de lo imprescindible de seguir reconstruyendo derechos básicos y esperanzas de futuro.

Ricard Gomà es profesor de ciencias políticas en la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, miembro de Barcelona en Comú, ex líder municipal de ‘ Iniciativa per Catalunya ‘ en Barcelona, Secretario de Bienestar Social (2003-2007) y el vicealcalde de Acción Social y Ciudadanía (2007-2011 ) del Ayuntamiento de Barcelona.

Governing Austerity in Montreal

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In this post,  Gregoire Autin reports the findings from the exploratory research in Montreal, carried out as part of the collaborative governance under austerity project, sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council as part of its Urban Transformations Network, and led by Prof. Jonathan Davies. In developing this case study, Gregoire worked with Professors Roger Keil from York University and Pierre Hamel from the University of Montreal.

In Montréal, we started our exploration of the relationships between governance institutions and austerity measures by interviewing executive members of important collaborative institutions. This was an interesting starting point as it allowed us to gather insiders’ views of collaboration at the metropolitan scale. We conducted 11 interviews and our questions were largely oriented towards meanings and origins of “austerity” on one side and the forms, functions and practices of collaboration in, with and against austerity measures on the other. While using the general comparative framework built for the research, we had to adapt and take into account the specific context of Montréal.

One of the main specificities is that the city was not really hit by the crisis in 2008 in particular; it has rather undergone different consecutive and ongoing crises since the 1970s. Consequently, austerity is never presented nor understood as a necessary policy in times of crisis. It is rather understood as a policy (and a politics) of state restructuring, rooted in a conservative and neoliberal ideology. Many respondents made a distinction between a supposedly necessary austerity in countries undergoing economic crises such as Greece or Spain, for example, and austerity measures rooted in a conservative ideology such as the ones implemented by the federal government under former Conservative Canadian Prime Minister Harper (2006-2015) and by  Quebec Premier Philippe Couillard’s Liberal provincial government. As such, the respondents’ understanding of austerity is strongly related to a deep dynamic of state restructuring in the context of a historic crisis of the Welfare-State. As an ideology, austerity – usually called “rigour” by the politicians in power – is upheld by conservative politicians, be it at the federal level of government under Harper’s reign or at the provincial level with Couillard’s government (in power since 2014).

One important aspect we investigated, and which remains to be further explored, is the articulation, at a local scale, of the different levels of government and decision-making. In Montréal, the history of collaboration is a long one: these different levels of government have always had to collaborate to some extent on different aspects. The three tiers of government – federal, provincial and municipal – don’t necessarily follow the same ideological approach. Thus, when the provincial administration undergoes serious austerity measures and cuts different programs, the municipal administration has to choose between increasing their participation in those programs (e.g. in public transportation), in order to supplement what has been cut at the provincial level, or maintain their financial participation and ask the other tiers of government to maintain commitments. This implies that the municipal government’s importance, at the local level, as a financing and regulating power, increases with the relative withdrawal of the provincial and federal governments.

But collaboration operates also at a different level, not only between the three tiers of government but also with actors of civil society, community organisations, the business sectors and trade unions. This is one of the notable features of Montréal where such tripartite consultations and collaborations have existed for a long time. Many community organisations get caught up between managing and contesting austerity measures which puts them in an uncomfortable place of tension: this fine line between providing a service and becoming a substitute to the state must always be walked by the different actors involved in collaboration. This is a sign of the conflicts and tensions of the state restructuring process going on in Canada and Quebec in general and more precisely in Montréal. After the failure of two successive urban regimes (from the 1950s to the 1970s and from the 1980s to 2010), Montréal is still in search of a new regime. It is interesting to see how collaboration mechanisms are redefined within austerity measures and how this impacts on the willingness of different social, economic and political actors to build a new urban regime.

Austerity measures are the harshest for the poor and underprivileged particularly in the health and education sectors. Reducing financing opportunities for the different institutions and community organisations, cutting in different programs, these measures usually target the welfare system and old social solidarity mechanisms. Even though it is difficult to predict what will come out of these austerity politics, it is still the poorer, the most underprivileged and the newest immigrants who will suffer most of it.

While those in power at the provincial level share a consensus around the “need” to reduce the public debt and, at the municipal level, the mayor has been willing to reduce its’ administration, in accord with the austerity ideology, other actors, notably the trade unions, community organisations and student movements, are actively contesting these measures. One of the main challenges these contesting actors face is coordination between them: in other words, mobilisation against austerity seems to be more sectorial than converging. Each actor faces their own problems and contradictions and this hinders the opportunity for collaboration and convergence in a movement against austerity.

This exploratory research allowed us to draw a general portrait of collaboration at the municipal level in Montreal, to look at the specificity of the context and, at the same time, the deeper trends and dynamics underlying austerity measures and programs and changes in collaboration patterns. What is particularly relevant to note is that austerity measures are not a new thing, born out of the 2008 crisis: it is rather rooted in a long historical process of state restructuring and redefinition of social solidarity and state legitimacy. It is in this perspective that we will have to continue analysing and studying collaborative governance and austerity in Montréal. The future research will focus more specifically on social practices looking at the way neighbourhood roundtables, managed by community actors, are promoting social values when negotiating or adapting to austerity measures.

Gregoire Autin is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at the Université de Montréal

Austerity and Human Rights in Leicester

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Following the UN’s condemnation of UK austerity policies, Adrian Bua reports on the impact of that these are having in Leicester, based on exploratory research carried out as part of the collaborative governance under austerity project.

A recent report by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has argued that the UK government may be failing to meet its international human rights obligations.  A range of concerns were raised, ranging from the limits imposed by the Trade Union Act (2016) on industrial action to lack of corporate regulation. However, notably for us, most of the challenges levelled at the UK government pivoted around austerity policies, and their disproportionate and discriminatory impact on the most disadvantaged. Specifically,  the UN investigative committee is expressed serious concern “about the disproportionate adverse impact that austerity measures, introduced since 2010, are having on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups” and reminded the UK government that austerity measures “must be temporary, necessary, proportionate, and not discriminatory.”

The UN is especially concerned about changes to the welfare system and the possible violation of social rights through cuts introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016. This is a topic we researched in Leicester as part of the exploratory phase of our project ‘collaborative governance under austerity’. The report highlights a series of issues that resonate with our analysis in Leicester.

First, it highlights sanctions in relation to benefit fraud with the absence of due process. National changes to welfare have bought in a regime that regulates, disciplines and punishes – what academics call “workfare”.  We know anecdotally that sanctions are leading some people to fall “off grid” and disappear from official records. Agencies agencies from the statutory and voluntary sectors aim to pick up the pieces, but their capacity to do so is being decimated by austerity.

Second, the report highlights employment practices including a rise in zero hour contracts and precarious employment. In terms of employment, our research and review of case literature suggests that poor working conditions have increased in the textile trade [link to report] and especially the hidden and ‘informal’ economy. However, some respondents argued that the local authority was hesitant to do anything about this because it might put off investors – a key way in which Leicester aims to overcome austerity. If the issue as to be highlighted, Leicester might be tainted by association with the “sweatshop economy”.

Third, changes to social benefits including the reduction of the household benefit cap, the four-year freeze on certain benefits and the reduction in child tax credits are also criticised. In Leicester housing was an important issue, where the council used a strategy of amelioration through using discretionary funds to ensure that those most at risk maintained a roof over their heads.

Dr Adrian Bua is Research Assistant at the Centre for Urban Research on Austerity, and Researcher at the New Economics Foundation

The EU Referendum and the ailings of contemporary democracy

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In this post Adrian Bua argues that Brexit highlights fundamental failures in contemporary British democracy.

Democracy was a key element of the debate around whether the UK should exit or remain in the EU. One of the main criticisms of the EU from both right and left is the distant and unaccountable nature of its institutions. And now, calls for the referendum to be repeated by those shocked by the actual and potential future consequences of ‘Brexit’ are increasingly popular. This move is condemned by Brexiteers as an affront to democracy. On the face of it, they make a valid point. The referendum result gave a clear, if narrow, mandate to leave. Ignoring it would further underline the reality of a pro-EU elite that has lost touch with those ‘ordinary people’ that politicians such as Farage argue have been oppressed by migration.

However, contemporary democratic theory places serious doubts on plebiscitary forms of decision making. In deliberative models it is not only the process of aggregating votes that matters, but also the processes of opinion formation preceding the vote. Leaving aside the widely debated, complex and unresolved issue of whether, and when, direct democratic processes are appropriate to make complex decisions – the phenomenon of the EU referendum highlighted clear deficits and inconsistencies in our representative democracy. In characteristically opportunistic fashion, David Cameron called a referendum to avoid a Tory split that could have been fatal for his 2015 election ambitions.  Martin Lodge and Will Jennings argue that this reflects a broader phenomenon whereby referenda are used not to advance democracy but for political leaders to control divisions in their own parties.

These inconsistencies reflect deep rooted problems in our political system. During the post-war consensus, the institutional landscape of British democracy was enriched by collective mass-membership organisations that had close relationships with political parties and kept them grounded in people’s lives. However, the current turmoil is arguably symptomatic of what Colin Crouch termed the UK’s condition of ‘post-democracy’.  The institutions of the social democratic consensus remain, but have been hollowed out by the de-politicising consequences of neo-liberalism and the dominance of politics by privileged individuals and big business. For citizens, elections have become a spectator sport, managed by experts and reported on by private media monopolies. The rise of single-issue politics has been a salutary development, but in no way has it matched the capacity for the institutions of collective action that heralded the social democratic era to channel demands into the political system.

I would argue that the vote in favour of Brexit is a symptom of Britain’s ‘post-democratic’ condition. It is no secret that it is the constituency that suffered the most from the economic re-structuring over the past few decades that favoured ‘Brexit’. The faith that neoliberal policy makers had for entrepreneurial private sector activity to replace the gutting on manufacturing and heavy industry never materialised in peripheral regions. Instead, what Colin Hay has termed an “anglo-liberal growth model” emerged – based on a service industry concentrated in London and consumption fuelled by private credit and a housing boom in the South East. Gordon Brown’s infamous declaration that boom and bust had been abolished revealed the institutionalisation what Colin Crouch termed an “unacknowledged policy regime”. The election-winning machine that was New Labour contributed to the post-democratic condition. Its obsession with “scientific” approaches to evidence based policy making cohered with Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis – politics becomes a managerial and technical endeavour. Citizen participation becomes limited to focus group and survey research designed to optimise the party’s chances to reflect public opinion and thus win elections. Importantly, this left behind the concerns of those working class constituencies that “have nowhere else to go”, as New Labour architect Peter Mandelson put it.

But the chickens have come home to roost. The financial crash, and ensuing recession, deepened the economic woes of peripheral regions. Public sector employment and redistribution from the proceeds of the economy in the South East reduced through austerity. This was compounded by the deepening of the, already established, ‘beggar thy neighbour’ politics that generated contempt for a dependency culture. The Brexit campaign deepened a discourse which was already well developed and increasingly propagated by corporate media empires, that blamed immigrants for economic woes – as well as a lack of ‘control’ over our borders and burdensome EU regulation. At the time of writing, the Labour Party which had given hope to so many people that this situation might change with the election of Jeremy Corbyn, is ripping itself apart with internal struggles between its left and right. It is unclear what the outcome will be, that is a debate for another day, but – regardless of whether Brexit materialises – it will certainly be of great importance in the struggle to shape a fairer, more inclusive and democratic Britain. Should the right win, we can expect even more tea mugs and headstones promising to control immigration than in the campaign ran by Ed Milliband.

Inside and outside the Labour Party, the left should counter this discourse by finding improved ways of communicating the message that the difficulties faced by many supporters of Brexit are not due to immigration, EU regulation of lax border controls, but by a deliberate, and by no means irreversible, re-shaping of the UK political economy since the late 1970’s.  An integral part of this is to articulate a left politics based on democratic participation, empowerment and investment in social services. As Adam Przeworski pithily stated “to discuss democracy without considering the economy in which that democracy must operate is an endeavour worthy of an ostrich”. The left needs to develop a coherent and convincing vision for an alternative political economy that delivers genuine equality of opportunity, and meaningfully redistributes wealth and power. In this vein, Jonathan Davies has called for the UK and European nations to develop a “Marshall Plan for the 21st Century”. It is imperative to put flesh on the bones of this idea, and organise for its fulfilment. Social democracy should end its flirtation with neo-liberalism and regain the necessary confidence to regenerate itself on its own grounds. There is a rich legacy of thinking on participatory forms of socialism to draw on here. EU elites seem keen to make an example of Britain through a painful divorce, and the disposition of the likely UK post-Brexit leadership will be to turn the UK (or what remains of it) into some sort of libertarian utopia and international tax haven – “a free-wheeling island nation” as put by one article outlining a terrifying blueprint for a post Brexit Britain. This “scorched earth plan” is the way we are currently headed, and it is not pretty.

Dr Adrian Bua researches for the Centre for Urban Research on Austerity and the New Economics Foundation.

Governing Austerity in Dublin

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This post outlines the main findings from the first round of research carried out by Dr Niamh Gaynor and Dr Eamonn McConnon in Dublin as part of the Collaborative Governance under Austerity project. It forms part of a series of blogs from the eight comparator cities in the project.

Situated at the centre of Ireland’s booming ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy from the late 1990s to 2007 and home to a quarter of the country’s population, Dublin has experienced a sharp contraction and decline since the rupture of the property bubble and associated banking crisis of 2008 onward.  The resultant austerity policies – adopted as a condition of an IMF/European Commission and European Central Bank bailout package in 2010 – have impacted significantly on the city at a number of levels.

Socio-economically, austerity has hit the poorest and most marginalised in the North and Inner City severely.  It has also impacted on a newly squeezed middle class, many of whom live in younger suburbs to the West of the city.  There has been a drop of 21 per cent in mean disposable income across the city and the drop in the income of the unemployed is reported to stand at 22 per cent.   Correspondingly, the rate of unemployment rose from 38,000 in 2006 to a high of 90,000 in 2012.  Although this figure dropped to 75,000 in 2015, interview respondents highlight consistent difficulties in meeting debt and bill payments, and poverty and inequality appear widespread and pervasive.  Political discourse and action on this has coalesced around the city’s massive housing crisis which is affecting working-class and middle-class families alike.  The combination of unemployment and escalating costs and taxes associated with austerity have led to widespread mortgage arrears and dispossession.  Homelessness is now a major issue across the city, most particularly in West Dublin.  With its roots in the city’s previous austerity cuts of the 1980s when the shift from local authority to public-private partnership management and provision began, the current housing situation is perhaps a harbinger of some of the more long-term impacts of austerity’s neoliberal prescriptions more broadly.

Administratively, the austerity-driven public recruitment embargo combined with a downsizing of the public sector has resulted in a 13 per cent reduction in staffing in local authorities across the country.  There have been significant attendant cuts to frontline services and supports.  According to one senior Council official interviewed for this research, Dublin City Council has suffered a 20-25 per cent cut to its overall budget and has gone from a personnel of 6,800 in 2010 to 5,000 today.  Other interviewees point to the ageing and somewhat fatigued workforce within the Council, suggesting there is little capacity or appetite for innovative governance within the city at this time of crisis.  Yet, somewhat paradoxically, many of the city’s institutions of collaborative governance – celebrated for their flexibility and innovativeness in the 1990s – have now been subsumed within the Council.  Notwithstanding these developments, there appears widespread agreement that the much touted opportunities for local government reform which formed part of the austerity package have been lost, and interviewees point to an ongoing torpidity and ineffectiveness within Dublin City Council.

Politically, a number of interviewees suggest that austerity has made a significant mark within the city due to the significant increase in the number of left wing ‘anti-austerity’ Councillors on the City Council following the last (2014) local elections.  While some interviewees see this as a positive development for the city, others bemoan the lack of experience of many of these new incumbents.  Others again point to their lack of power in any case as national political authorities continue to wield significant influence on the traditionally weak and powerless local council through both party allegiances and the central figure of the City Manager – a political appointee.  While the formal institutions of Council politics remain a focal point for interviewees and critics of austerity more broadly, interesting things are happening across a variety of more disparate sites within the city which point to a range of new political actors, new political alliances and new ways of doing politics.  Most noteworthy among these is the so-called ‘right to water’ movement – a national movement which is particularly active in coalescing around the newly introduced (2015) and much contested water charges.  Survey findings which show that over 50 per cent of those involved are first-time activists concerned with austerity more broadly rather than water charges per se, point to significant developments across the city’s broader public sphere.  And the fact that the water charges constituted the ‘red line issue’ in coalition negotiations between the two main political parties following the February 2016 elections attest to the political potency of this public sphere.

So what does all this mean for our overall research question – what happens to collaborative governance under austerity?  In Dublin our findings to date point to two things.  On the one hand, collaborative governance is continuing, albeit in a retrenched, rationalised and bureaucratised form which is now solely focused on coping with, surviving and managing the social fallout of austerity. The role for policy making and the flexibility and innovation associated with collaborative governance arrangements and configurations of the past is now gone and competition, rather than collaborative relationship-building and networking appears to be its overriding characteristic.  On the other, new sites of more radical, direct resistance are evident which, through many of the newly elected ‘anti-austerity’ City Councillors, are forming new alliances and coalitions.  Could we view these as new sites and forms of collaborative governance with new norms and practices, allowing for contestation and debate?  Or does this signal the demise of collaborative governance in Dublin?  Our next phase of research will focus on the two questions of a) if and how traditional collaborative governance actors and institutions interact with these new coalitions and interests and b) what the motivations, aspirations, plans and strategies of these new political actors and coalitions are.

Dr Niamh Gaynor is Lecturer in Development Studies and Dr Eamonn McConnon a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City Univesrity

A European in Leicester: a poem on Brexit

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In this post Hulya Oztel shares a poem she wrote after the Brexit vote, capturing how she feels as a French citizen working and living in the UK.

Channel

I did not know I cared for the Channel that much,
I did not know I cared at all.
I now realise she was sheltering me.

Britain thinks she has left Europe
United she has – with the worst of the continent.

The gangrene has spread,
Spilling out of foul mouths – aloud.

The gangrene has spread,
Its stench pushing us apart.

The gangrene has spread,
polluting our children’s future

Hulya’s feelings mirror those expressed by P.J. Harvey in her song “England” (listen here). They reflect the sadness that stems from the rise of the far right – in France over the last 20 years, and now in the UK.

Hulya Oztel is Principal Lecturer at the Leicester Business School in De Montfort University