political economy

Blazing the Neoliberal Trail: Review by Jonathan Davies

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Professor Jonathan Davies continues our second installment of CURA’s book debates by share’s his thoughts on Tim Weaver’s recent book ‘Blazing the Neoliberal Trail‘. This post will be followed by a final reply from Tim int he forthcoming weeks.

It was a great honour to debate Tim’s new book at the annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Association earlier this year.  The book announces Tim as an important new thinker in the field or urban political economy.  It was a pleasure to read a deeply learned piece of work presented with erudition and lightness of touch.  Perhaps the most interesting thing I learned from the book concerns the dynamics and temporalities of policy transfer.  We tend to assume that because the UK likes to borrow (ever more right wing) policies from the USA, that the USA was the main trailblazer in neo-liberal urban policy.  In fact, Tim shows that the UK was able to outpace the USA, because its centralized and hierarchical political traditions made this easier to accomplish.  More broadly, these differentiations show why an urban focus is so important for getting to grips with the epidemiology, variegation, hybridity and contestation of neoliberalism.

The main question I have about the book concerns the way different disciplinary perspectives open up different temporal understandings of neoliberalism.  I pick up on a striking phrase in Tim’s conclusion in relation to the class politics of neoliberalism. He argues that the “bourgeoisie was not knocking on doors”, demanding enterprise zones and urban development corporations.  These initiatives were driven politically, and hence Marxist conceptions of capital and class do not really help us understand them.  Tim accordingly emphasizes the role of policy ideas and entrepreneurs, and the way in which different configurations of institutions and traditions were more or less open to change.  These factors undoubtedly matter a great deal, but I do not think they are incompatible with a Marxist analysis, rooted in the ideas circulating and gathering force during the emerging social and economic crises of the 1960s.

From a sociological perspective, Boltanski and Chiapello argued in The New Spirit of Capitalism, that by the 1960s, the bourgeoisie was indeed clamouring for change, hankering to be free from the stultifying command structures associated with Fordist development and the Weberian political order.  But, it is notable that similar ideas were also incubating in the British Labour Party and US Democrats, through Harold Wilson’s “white heat of the technological revolution”, and John. F. Kennedy’s “new frontiers”. So, from the standpoint of ideas, the break with the post-war order was implicit in the emerging political and economic zeitgeist of 1960s for both left and right.  Ultimately, for reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, the neoliberals succeeded in appropriating this spirit and translating it into the policy agendas Tim discusses at length in the book.  Two points follow.

First, governments and corporations were both influenced by proto-neoliberal ideas and sentiments well before the 1970s and 80s and sought to organize around them.  It is here that we find the roots of the crisis of the post-war order and of neoliberal transformation.  Tim might respond, correctly, that neoliberal ideas did not fully grip on the terrain of politics and policy until much later – and after many brutal struggles.  However, the second and crucial point is that looking at the 1960s shows that neoliberalism was indeed a class project and why a sharp analytical distinction between state and capital is problematic. There is a tacit pluralism in Tim’s approach, which does not sit easily with his general political orientation. If instead we treat capitalist states as part of the capitalist system, it is easier to see why “progressive” political leaders would be dazzled by a “new spirit of capitalism” promising social and economic renaissance – and for reasons that have little to do with political pressure from the bourgeoisie.  Of course corporations try to influence governments, but the absence of such lobbying does not mean class power is not central. Class operates in many more-or-less subtle ways.  My argument is that an appreciation of how different classes responded to the burgeoning crises of the 1960s is critical for understanding the ideas and policies of later trailblazers of neoliberalism, so deftly analysed in this important volume.

Blazing the Neoliberal Trail: Timothy Weaver

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In this post Timothy Weaver begins our second installment of our ‘book debates’ series, by outlining the main argument of his recent book ‘Blazing the Neo-liberal Trail‘, where he charts the development of neo-liberal hegemony in the UK and the US through urban politics and policy making perspective. In a forthcoming post Jonathan Davies will share his thoughts on this work, and Timothy will then publish a reply.

During the 1970s, the US and the UK grappled in strikingly similar ways with a set of economic problems that American liberalism and British social democracy failed to counter: stagflation, rising unemployment, and the corresponding erosion of elite consensus over economic policy. Out of this morass, neoliberalism emerged as an ideology and set of policy prescriptions that became adopted by a series of governments, beginning with the center-left administrations of Jimmy Carter and Jim Callaghan, and then in full force under governments of the right led by Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. In Blazing the Neoliberal Trail, I use urban politics and policymaking to chart the rise and effects of the neoliberal embrace both in the realm of national urban policymaking and through case studies of Philadelphia and London Docklands.

Blazing makes two key arguments. First, I focus on policies such as enterprise zones and urban development corporations to suggest that the timing, extent, and character of neoliberal urban policymaking was shaped by the manner in which national and subnational institutional structures mediated the influence of neoliberal ideas and the policy entrepreneurs who promoted them. To echo Robert Lieberman’s (2011) formulation, while ideas provided the “motive,” institutions offered the “opportunity” for neoliberalization of urban policy. Thus, in the U.K., the ideologically motivated Thatcher government was able to exploit its institutional advantages—unified and centralized governmental structures—to rapidly transform urban policy. Hence, the enterprise zone policy bore a strong resemblance to the neoliberal idea that people such as Sir Peter Hall and Lord (Geoffrey) Howe had in mind. By contrast, neoliberal policy entrepreneurs such as Ronald Reagan and Jack Kemp encountered resistance as Democrats, initially hostile to urban neoliberalism, exploited the institutional advantages afforded to them by the system of separation of powers and divided government. As such, the enterprise zone policy was stymied in Congress and could only gain a foothold at state and local levels where the program was often watered-down thereby sometimes deviating from the original neoliberal design.

The second central argument of the book is that, in part due to differing institutional contexts, neoliberalization has occurred by two distinct logics. The first, which I term neoliberalism by design, refers to the process by which political actors exploit the power of state institutions to impose a neoliberal blueprint. The case of London Docklands reflects this pattern of development. By contrast, the Philadelphia example reveals a logic of neoliberalism by default. In this case, neoliberalization takes a more serpentine path. Due to federalism, neoliberal designs could not be forced on Philadelphia by actors in Washington D.C. Rather, fiscal constraints—of local and national origin—the challenges of coalition building, and ideological constriction pushed the city in a neoliberal direction despite the fact that many of the key policymakers were not ideologically committed to a neoliberal program.

Dr Timothy Weaver is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, USA

The Visible Hand: George Osborne and the Labour Market

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CURA’s Professor Phil Almond writes about contradictions in  labour market policy that are apparent in the government’s March 2016 budget.

George Osborne’s Budget appears to have been a much less successful exercise in fostering hegemony than his immediate post-election efforts. This is perhaps unsurprising given the contradictions involved in the joint pursuit of austerian governance, traditional Conservative clientelism, and the attempt to manage Conservative Party tensions on Europe through the mechanism of a referendum on European Union membership at a juncture where populist anti-elite pressures of varying political stripes are widespread and growing.

To an employment relations researcher like myself, contradictions are particularly evident in the labour market sphere. In particular, it is worth thinking about the relations between the legislative attack on trade union freedom of the Trade Union Bill (which coincidentally sustained non-fundamental, but non-trivial damage in the House of Lords on the the day of the budget), the National Living Wage, the continued confusion around the introduction of an Apprenticeship Levy, and the wider approach to political economy of the current government.

Of these, the Trade Union Bill is the simplest to decipher, representing as it does a straightforward continuity with Thatcherism. Nobody with experience of the 1980s and 1990s history of regulation of industrial relations would be particularly surprised that a Conservative government would pursue such policies. In industrial relations terms – ignoring for the time being the obvious partisan attack on Labour Party funding – most commentary seems to have concentrated on the increased balloting thresholds for strike action, and to a lesser extent on the issue of trade union facility time. Important as these are, it is regrettable that the proposal to lift the ban on using agency workers to replace permanent staff during strikes, which represents a fundamental challenge to the right to strike as understood in ILO conventions, has not taken greater prominence in the debates on and opposition to the Bill.

The National Living Wage and Apprenticeship Levy, however, need somewhat more thinking about. Having worked as a researcher on wage protection at the time that the National Minimum Wage was proposed and introduced by the first Blair government, and witnessed the extent of Thatcherite-Conservative opposition to the “interference” in the labour market that statutory wage protection represents, it is clear that Osborne represents something of a departure here from Keith Joseph.

Readers of this blog presumably do not require an employment relations academic to point out that the current upgrading of the minimum wage does not represent a progressive policy, coming as it does in the context of a shrinking of the benefits system that of course is profoundly regressive. It is also worth noting in passing the “National Living Wage” is nothing of the kind – any basic or minimum income level, however calculated, clearly has to be expressed on a weekly or monthly basis. Very obviously, if sustenance comes from waged labour, then an hourly rate is only as good as the multiplier of how many hours of work are paid for. Given those at the bottom of the labour market are generally on marginal part-time or zero-hours contracts, a vocabulary of “living” wage is not appropriate. That George Osborne is prepared to use this language as part of a hegemonic strategy is one thing, but those in favour of redistribution to the working poor should not.

Nonetheless, proposing non-trivial increases to minimum wages, in the context of austerian governance, does represent something of a change of thinking as to how the right goes about shrinking the state. The Thatcherite position of avoiding ‘constraints’ on employers in order to encourage the free market to clear has morphed into a position where the over-riding imperative is that the poor are not sustained by the state, even if this involves what a previous generation of Conservatives would have termed “interference” in labour markets. Whether George Osborne is a convert to established social democratic arguments that increasing minimum wages has positive effects on productivity is unclear. Still, to some extent, austerity seems to have trumped the “old school” brand of neo-liberalism of the Thatcher/Major era.

This is also the case with the apprenticeship levy; essentially, a pay-bill tax on large employers to be dedicated to apprenticeship training, sweetened in the Budget by a government top-up. How this will work, in particular what the resources raised will be used for in an, at-best, confusing system of initial vocational training, is unclear. However, some of the motives are not dissimilar to the minimum wage increase; vocational training needs to be improved, and the state does not want to bear the financial or coordination costs, notwithstanding the exceptionally poor degree of coordination between firms on skills and training in the UK. It is worth noting that in my conversations with practitioners aiming to attract foreign direct investment to the UK, it is clear that the idea of a levy has a substantial degree of opposition from mobile firms, including many that do require advanced skills. Again, while individual labour market policies need to be looked at within the context of the overall political economy and distributional policies of the government, it remains interesting that the Osborne strategy does in places require a fairly visible hand.

Phil Almond is Professor of Comparative Employment Relations at DMU, a member of CURA and CROWE, a DMU-based research group on organisations, work and employment.

Taking Power Back: Review by CURA

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Professor Jonathan Davies and Dr Adrian Bua from CURA respond to Simon Parker’s  previous  blog where he explained the argument of his recent book ‘Taking Power Back‘. This blog will be followed over the next few weeks with a reply by Simon.

Taking Power Back is written as a provocation – a manifesto for change – at a moment when the ruthlessly centralising tradition of British politics is under greater critical scrutiny than ever before. As Simon Parker explains in his blog post, current levels of centralisation in British politics are unsustainable and the call for radical decentralisation, driven by the social action of place-based individuals and communities is timely.  Moreover, Simon argues that with the end of austerity nowhere in sight, the halcyon days of the welfare state are in any case well and truly over. Something has to be done.

Simon’s alternative is encapsulated in the idea of ‘commonism’, a new kind of society based on self-help and mutual aid enabled by a more local, relational and supportive state, rather than the over-bearing centralised behemoth developed since the post war era. Simon thinks that we are moving into a conjuncture more favourable to commonism, as experiments proliferate and the state slowly and reluctantly begins to show awareness of its limitations. In his analysis, the push for devolution and localism is more than a mere straw in the wind.   The wave of city deals, with the Greater Manchester Combined Authority at the forefront (which Simon discusses at length) signals an opportunity to develop the ‘commonist’ agenda and forge a path to a more decentralised and democratic polity.  Taking Power Back is at once resolutely pragmatic and visionary.  Commonism is not communism, a system that envisions the entire system of production, distribution and exchange socialised and democratised.  Rather, the practices of commoning sit in a nebulous and uneasy relationship with state and market.  It rests tacitly on re-working the classic state-market-civil society triad.

However, preoccupation with the critique of statism means the triad is never adequately discussed.  For example, Simon is very reticent about markets, corporations and economic crises. Contemporary political economy tells us that states and markets are deeply inter-dependent. Much of what states do in the 21st century is about extending the reach of the profit economy.  Take austerity, a policy regime Simon tends to take for granted: it undermines the resources of localism in ways that seem destined to shrivel the commons.  First, we know that cuts in state funding drive local community organisations to the wall.  Second, government contracts are deeply biased towards corporate contractors and large extra-local civil society organisations (the so-called “primes”), and against local organisations.  Third, austerity welfare and its extraordinarily punitive sanctioning regime so envelops and bureaucratises the lives of millions of unemployed and working poor citizens, that it is hard to envisage them finding the time or cognitive space to do any volunteering or commoning.

These deeply reactionary trends arguably diminish the space for commoning, but perhaps more importantly they point to a huge oversight in Simon’s analysis.  Taking Power Back will not be accomplished by going with the flow, it can only be a deeply conflictual process oriented to reversing malign trends in our society – the expansion of markets and corporations, the boa-constrictor of state regulation and the predatory character of civil society “primes”, all of which conspire to corrode the local and the democratic. Simon’s call for a universal wage (or basic income) to unlock commoning capacity is an acceptance that sharpening inequalities need to be addressed.  Yet, it is hard to see how this can be accomplished without, at the very least, reversing austerity and in the process taking on recalcitrant interests throughout the state, market and corporatised civil society sectors.

Viewed through this lens, the current devolution and localism agendas are deeply problematic, accentuating anti-democratic developments antithetical to ‘commonism’.

Simon acknowledges the anti-democratic manner in which “Devo Manc” was accomplished – a deal struck between local and central state elites. Moreover, greater local responsibility for allocating a shrinking budget presided over by boosterist metro-mayors is no basis for a flourishing municipal commons, particularly under a grossly punitive benefits regime over which the centre exercises an iron grip. This is compounded by declining standards in what researchers at ‘Manchester Capitalism’ have called the ‘foundational economy’. This consists precisely of those businesses and services to meet the basic needs that are the bread and butter of ‘commonism’, yet, the foundational is increasingly beset by casualised work, and operates as a cash cow for big business.

As Simon recognises, under capitalism, technological innovation and productivity do not usher in a world of leisure. They rather concentrate power in the hands of techno-elites and shrink the labour market.  Nowhere is the dystopian character of the digital age clearer than in San Francisco, where the predatory elites of Silicon Valley make the city unliveable for working class people and complain at having to look at the human refuse left in their wake.

We live in a world of confected scarcity (austerity) and ever-rising inequality in a highly precarious global economic conjuncture. Simon is right that a flourishing commons depends on greater equality, in a world of plenty.  But there is a vast gap between our world and the world of the Morrisonian commons.  Taking Power Back offers a welcome stimulus to those thinking about how a better world might come into being. Simon’s wager is that examples of commoning in action can be pedagogic in the sense of showcasing the virtues of “commonism” to all, at a time when elites seem a little more aware of their limitations.  Our concern is that these are not the most powerful trends in our society. It is hard to see the pursuit of social justice as anything other than an elemental struggle in the 21st century, without which new political economies of solidarity will remain confined to the margins.

Professor Jonathan Davies is director and Dr Adrian Bua a core member of the Centre for Urban Research on Austerity

Regional Savings Banks and the Financial Crisis in Spain

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The sovereign debt crisis that put the Spanish socialist (PSOE) government under pressure to begin an austerity programme in May 2010  started two years earlier in a crisis of the financial system.  Whilst central government initially dismissed it as a transient banking liquidity crisis derived from the global interbank lending drought, it soon proved to be a crisis of solvency.  And it was largely cooked in the country’s not-for-profit regional financial institutions, the savings banks. In a pyrrhic victory, they almost overtook commercial banks –the dominant element of national capital— in being the lynchpin of the ‘Spanish model’, a macro-economic system based on deepening existing specializations in tourism, property development and construction as ‘competitive advantages’ adapted to the global economy.

Forty-three out of forty-five savings banks, which had roughly made up half of the Spanish banking system, disappeared. The depth of their solvency problems, the policies implemented by central governments and the deterioration of the economy did away with them. After a complex programme of mergers, savings banks were transformed into commercial banks in 2012. Many were later nationalized and sold cheap to centre banks—effectively reinforcing centripetal flows of capital and resorting to strategies of accumulation by dispossession.

Many savings banks had evolved from being not-for-profit, regional and public-administration-funding into de-territorialising and financialising institutions competing for a larger share of the market. Savings banks were mutual financial institutions set up via foundational funds and managed by boards of stakeholders –founders, local authorities, savers and employees. With their duties to foster savings, develop the economy of their locality and carry out social works, they became anchor institutions in their cities/regions of origin. But since the liberalisation of the Spanish economy, and the deepening of financial market integration during the 1990s, they underwent a prolonged weakening of their regulatory boundaries –‘freeing’ their banking activities and undoing their territorial-boundedness—which encouraged many (particularly the riskier ones with less liquidity) to participate in securitization and high leverage practices (via money-markets) characteristic of financial centres.

The framework established by the Maastricht Treaty and monetary union brought about strong purchasing power that saw major Spanish commercial banks expanding internationally. And it also brought a lowering of (the very high) interest rates and a price war at home. In Catalonia this was markedly felt when the largest of its savings banks (and largest in the EU) La Caixa switched its rates to the Euribor in 2004. La Caixa had a strong pull effect on other savings banks and, in a more competitive market, they saw profit margins squeezed and found they needed to increase their investment volume (for which deposits were now not enough) just to maintain their levels of profit.

Securitization and wholesale markets provided savings banks with a massive volume of resources. The Land Act of 1998 (which made vast amounts of land available for construction) together with changes to securitization laws; lower interest rates; higher investment needs and the traditional pattern of channelling resources to sheltered sectors of the economy by Spanish banks (such as  construction) helped build an ‘urban development tsunami’. This tsunami was built with the mass influx of EU capitals invested in Spanish mortgage-backed securities and other property assets of which savings banks were keen originators.

This liquidity surge was used in lending investments that fed the bubble. Credit to finance construction reached 60% of total credit. Lending practices worsened as savings banks bought construction companies and began selling flats and mortgages via real estate agents working on commission for them. They expanded outside their own city-regions losing their clients’ trust and information advantage characteristic of their proximity banking. Moreover, lending policies rooted in savings banks’ traditional function of providing financial inclusion became predatory when, in their competition for new clients, savings banks targeted the influx of low-income urban migrant communities, as happened in Barcelona. So-called ‘dinghy’ loans –the Catalan version of US ninja loans—became Spain’s own toxic assets.

Regional financial spaces in Spain were connected to EU and global financial markets. Without this link it is difficult to understand how the housing bubble and the crisis began and unfolded.  The financial crisis soon became a general economic crisis triggering mass unemployment and shortage of credit. But, whilst the banking system was restructured and propped up by centre government and an EU/IMF bailout in 2012 (which came with strict austerity conditionality) the weight of the crisis burden was shifted onto the population.

The distribution of the initial impact of the financial debacle was uneven. Cities were badly affected but in some regions there was a marked urban-rural continuum.  Thus, the metropolitan area of Barcelona was ground zero for evictions with 59.030 cases (trailed only by Madrid with 52.276 cases). In the north-western region of Galicia the mis-selling of preference shares to unwitting savers was widespread. Regions and local authorities account for about 50% of public spending and they are responsible for delivery of most services. But real estate taxation is the architrave of their fiscal system (together with cash transfers). Without recourse to one of their traditional sources of financing, their fiscal woes  worsened following the bust and budget cuts and many had to resort eventually to the strict conditionality of the regional liquidity mechanism set up by central government to face their debt. Many also had to pick up the tab for the spending formerly financed via social works.

An archipelago of citizen interventions scattered throughout Spain demonstrated the depth of popular discontent and made up for the neglect of public authorities in dealing with the social wreckage. Citizen-led groups emerged to advocate for the interests of the masses of people in precarious housing situations as well as for those affected by the collapse of preference shares in financial institutions such as BANKIA. These groups pushed local authorities to achieve solutions. These ‘civic platforms’ also fed into broader social movements such as the indignados, and the formation of the new political party Podemos.

So far, they have already had a political impact in the victory of citizen political platforms in the 2014 municipal elections in Madrid and Barcelona, among other urban spaces. Newcomer parties Ciudadanos (centre-right) and Podemos (left) are widely expected to end Spain’s bipartisan political system in the coming general elections on the 20th of December. But it remains to be seen what they will do to transform the financial system. So far, whilst Podemos proposes an ambitious programme of democratization of the economy (including public banking, non-recourse mortgages and managed personal bankruptcy, financial transparency and taxation), Ciudadanos barely mentions finance in its economic measures.

Dr Paula Portas-Perez is visiting research fellow at the department of politics and international relations at Cardiff University. This post is based on Paula’s article ‘Plain vanilla banking? The financialization of Spanish regional savings banks’, which is forthcoming in ‘Regional Science, Regional Studies’.

Managing Capitalism in Latin America: the Decline of the ‘Pink Tide’

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Following over a decade of relatively high growth rates wedded to redistribution, increased social spending, and the incorporation of labour and social movements into the wheels of decision making, consistent electoral success of the political Left in countries as diverse as Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and Venezuela had given the progressive ‘Pink Tide’ a growing sense of permanency. Latin America  has been heralded by many on the Left – most prominently in Manuel Riesco’s concept of the Developmental Welfare State – as a new model for development that breaks substantively with the neoliberal consensus.

But beginning with the economic and political convulsions in Brazil centred on a deepening corruption investigations linked to the ruling Workers’ Party (PT) and a widespread middle-class dissatisfaction with the government of Dilma Rousseff this is being increasingly shaken. The language and practices of austerity have begun to re-emerge in these states, with Brazil, the largest economy in the region, taking the lead in reducing social spending, unemployment protections, and taxation in a strategic re-orientation in favour of powerful business interests that began as early as Rousseff’s first government after 2012.

The unexpected electoral victory of conservative former businessman Mauricio Macri in Argentina has reinforced the growing clamour that proclaims the end of the informal progressive regional coalition. The first non-Peronist leader to gain office through democratic election since 1983, Macri has come to power with a mandate to address the “mistakes” of Kirchnerism through a new commitment to free-market economic policy. Despite assurances he will sustain some of the popular social policies previously implemented, he now represents the leading edge of the re-emergence of austerity practices.

The phrase “re-emergence” is used deliberately in these contexts as such restrictions on social spending, the rolling back of protections for labour, and the use of varied mechanisms of economic policy to promote regressive redistribution upwards to powerful firms and financial capital are all too familiar. Chile under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet 1973 and Argentina under the post-1976 military dictatorship and the disastrous economic stewardship of Carlos Menem in the 1990s, saw first-hand the deleterious impact of such a constellation of policy measures. IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes, most notably with Mexico in 1995, also consolidated this global counterrevolution in the region and the dramatic reversal of the “populist” redistribution and government spending strategies of the twentieth century.

The Pink Tide had ostensibly offered a peaceful interlude in these devastations, first of neoliberalism and now of emergent austerity in Latin America, as well as a return to the policies of redistribution and state support for workers. Backed by neostructuralist ideas and programmatised as strategies of neodevelopmentalism that sought to combine state-led development with an openness to international markets, progressive Latin American governments (from Lula Inácio da Silva and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and Néstor and Cristina Fernández Kirchner in Argentina to Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia) offered the possibility of growth with increasing equality, social spending to support the poor, and the genuine inclusion of the voices of workers and social movements in the politics.

Yet this distinction from the policies and practices that preceded and followed it have increasingly been shown to be deeply problematic. Alfredo Saad-Filho writing on Brazil has argued that despite the rhetoric of reform there has been little substantive change either to the political configuration of power (represented in the Constitution inherited from military rule) or in the hegemony of neoliberalism and concomitant international economic integration. On Ecuador, Jeffrey Webber goes further to argue that Rafael Correa, despite positioning himself on the radical edge of the Pink Tide alongside Bolivia and Venezuela, has deliberately demobilised the social movements that brought him to power, restoring economic power and privilege across sectors and actors that are the antithesis of his proclaimed project.

So, if not a progressive interlude contrasting the varying strategies of neoliberal and austerity capitalism, what does the Pink Tide and its neodevelopmentalist model represent? It would be too simplistic to dismiss it as a mere fraud. Evidence economic growth and redistribution in leading economies of the region does not bear this out. Declines in poverty through the famous ‘Bolsa Familia’ cash transfers to the poorest families in Brazil under Lula and the universal child support measures introduced by Cristina Kirchner (which Macri has at the moment vowed to retain) provoked a genuine redistribution of wealth towards the lower end of society. Attempts to reverse neoliberal reforms of education in Chile, the prominence of indigenous social movements in Bolivia, and environmental proposals in Ecuador also pointed to the opening up of potential new space for the redistribution of political power.

Instead, these measures must be viewed along a continuum of strategies aimed at managing capitalism. I have developed this line of argument in other areas of my research to date inasmuch as the varied progressive and regressive strategies that comprised the period of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) during the twentieth century in Latin America represented distinct efforts to intensify exploitation and – most significantly – suppress and discipline labour to this end. The limitations and contradictions of the Pink Tide, identified elsewhere by a growing number of scholars, combined with the apparent ease at which the return to the practices and processes associated with austerity and the neoliberalism of the 1980s and 1990s, imply this progressive turn must be viewed through the same lens.

Significantly, it is by returning to the workplace, the space that at CURA’s launch event last month Phil Taylor described as the “front line” of austerity where managerial strategies seek to squeeze out maximum effort at minimum cost as the epitome of exploitation, that these contradictions can become most apparent. Alongside experience of the harsh disciplining of restrictive economic and social policies, the region has seen some of the clearest examples whereby relatively progressive developmental strategies have served to incorporate workers into intensified social organisations of production with increasing work rhythms.

The archetypical populist regimes of Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Perón in Argentina serve as an important point of reference, offering an ostensible voice to organised labour whilst supporting a transformation of labour processes that deepened exploitative relations of contemporary capitalism – most obviously with the Peronist “Productivity Conferences” of 1954. More closely linked were the developmentalist strategies adopted by Arturo Frondizi in Argentina after 1958 and Juscelino Kubitschek after 1956, which sought to attract foreign capital through a liberalisation of trade and investment regulation that facilitated what I have referred to elsewhere as a “disciplinary modernisation” of industrial production.

In the same vein, the proclaimed progressive strategies of the Pink Tide have gone hand in hand with appeals to foreign investment across modern sectors, to the continued opening up of once-protected sectors to the rigours of international competitive pressures that reposition domestic firms in the global economy and impose regressive technological and organisational changes. It has even led to a return to ‘extractivism’ (most notably in Ecuador) associated with a bygone era of the nineteenth century widely critiqued by regional and international scholars. It is by analysing the changing relations in production of neodevelopmentalism and the Pink Tide, as well as the changes that have occurred before and after, that will make possible a comprehensive understanding of the management of capitalism and the interconnectedness of these periods of harsh restriction and ostensibly progressive social peace.

Dr Adam Fishwick is a CURA team member as well as Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of Politics and Public Policy, De Montfort University

The Autumn Spending Review: A Political but not an Economic Fix?

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After the Government’s spending review on 25th November, I was struck by how experienced political commentators were fumbling to get a grip on the detail of its plans and forecasts. What lies beneath the headlines and soundbytes will become clear with time, but some general contours and contradictions are already emerging from the Chancellor’s “smoke and mirrors”.

The headlines will say that George Osborne reversed controversial proposals to cut tax credits – a U-turn for which shadow Chancellor John McDonnell quickly claimed credit for the Labour Party. But, they have not been reversed for people on the new Universal Credit system – a reform critics see as a serious benefits cut in itself. Moreover, tax credits will remain frozen and diminish in value. Osborne devolved some control over elements of local government finance, but with multiple strings attached. Council tax rises are permissible, but must be ring-fenced to adult care. Business rate rises are permissible, and local authorities will retain the returns. However, additional rate levies will depend on the consent of local business elites. Councils will have the same to spend in “cash terms” in 2020 as they do now. This announcement foreshadows major public service reductions, but on a scale impossible to anticipate without knowing other volatile variables in advance. The government, and councils, are investing hope in the integration of health and adult social care as a way of delivering austerity without outright retrenchment. Yet according to Lord Porter, Chair of the Local Government Association, a new round of cuts is likely to push councils to the edge of collapse. Osborne has spoken frequently of Britain moving from high welfare-high tax to a high wage-low welfare economy, predicated on increases to the minimum wage. Yet, an hourly living wage is only a real living wage for people working enough hours in the week to surpass income poverty thresholds. It will not be a living wage for those on part-time or zero hours contracts – or those in precarious self-employment.

Whatever the merits and drawbacks of specific cuts and measures, the holy grail of Osborne’s Chancellorship is delivering a budget surplus in 2020. The Office for Budget Responsibility suggested he will be boosted by an unexpected increase in tax receipts through the middle of this parliament, a claim immediately qualified by Chairman Robert Chote. Even if he enjoys good fortune with the tax receipt numbers, Osborne faces formidable barriers. Responding to the spending review, John McDonnell was quick to remind us of the Chancellor’s poor forecasting record. In 2010, the government said it would eliminate the budget deficit by 2015. Now, we are told this will occur in 2020. With the support of the Labour Party, the media and much of the public, the last government set a welfare-spending cap. Today, we were told the cap has been breached and will not be met until 2019. Ultimately, all depends on forecasts for sustained GDP growth at rates of 2.3 or 2.4% for each of the next five years. But such a stable pattern would be exceptional. In the best-case scenario, GDP growth will fluctuate in an upward direction. In the worst-case scenario, underlying weaknesses in the economic recovery will soon trigger another recession.

In short, it is plausible that before long, the government will have to revise its forecasts again and come back for more. If a budget surplus remains the primary goal of British economic policy, further attrition of the welfare state and corrosion of the public realm is the price we will be asked to pay. Even then, the goal could be elusive.

Jonathan Davies – Director, Centre for Urban Research on Austerity

Community Wealth Building in Preston

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By Matthew Brown

It is without doubt that much of Europe is in the grip of an austerity crisis.  However to build a genuine alternative to it we need to think deeper about its causes and ask questions about the fundamental undemocratic nature of our economy to be able to respond to what has also become a systemic crisis.

The 2008 global financial crash emerged from an unregulated financial sector under little form of democratic control.  The harsh austerity we see at present is a payback for the £5500 each family in our country had to contribute to bail out the banking sector.  This money is now being recouped in the form of public spending cuts, benefit and tax credit cuts, tax rises, pay freezes and increased student tuition fees which are increasingly hitting the middle class.

Added to this Richard Murphy calculates up to £120 billion per year is lost in tax avoidance and evasion often by large multinational corporations and rich individuals and Aditya Chakrabortty has produced evidence recently that an additional £93 billion per year is paid in corporate subsidy.  A mere drop in the ocean compared to the estimated £1 to £2 billion a year lost to the wider public purse through benefit fraud.

Despite this vast public wealth injected into the system there is a dearth of investment from corporations. The major banks are not properly lending to individuals and local businesses and reliance on “inward investment” over the last 30 years has produced an economy in which a fifth of what was once paid in wages has disappeared. As a result, the UK has become one of the most unequal countries in Europe.

We must look to produce a response in our communities to this systemic crisis.  To do this we should examine how wealth is produced and then capture and democratise the wealth at source.  Much can be done locally and regionally but a national government with an understanding of this system problem would fully complete the picture.

In Preston and Lancashire we are experimenting with part of the alternative.  It is inspired by regions and cities that have built a culture of economic democracy like Mondragon, Spain and emerging progressive thinking in parts of the USA.  What is significant is the economic crash of 2008 onwards had little effect in terms of unemployment and poverty in Mondragon but also in North Dakota with its sophisticated network of devolved public banking.

This new democratic local economy in the UK will have at it’s heart procurement with Councils and other placed based institutions like Universities, Colleges, Hospitals and Housing Associations spending hundreds of billions on goods and services every year but not always considering where they are buying goods and services from and what social and economic benefit that wealth can bring.

The Preston City Council led Community Wealth Building initiative has now identified over £1 billion per annum in spend on goods and services by participating “anchor institutions” in Lancashire.  The long term aim is to shift more of this wealth to local businesses and if there are gaps in provision, to fill them with new worker cooperatives.  The consultancy we are working with, the Centre for Local Economic Strategies (CLES) has begun to change procurement culture of Manchester City Council, increasing their purchasing to over 65% from the Manchester economy adding more than 5000 jobs.  What is unique in Lancashire is the public sector institutions involved are collectively adopting this ‘quasi planning’ strategy to maximise the social and economic impact of this collective pool of wealth to the local economy.

There are also vast swathes of wealth within communities in local authority pension funds.  Lancashire’s County Pension Fund has investments of over £5.5 billion which in reality is the deferred incomes of tens of thousands of local public sector workers.  The Preston, South Ribble and Lancashire City Deal has earmarked £100 million of pension money to be invested in commercial development in the local economy producing a sustainable return for fund members and creating a social dividend in the communities they live.  Elsewhere in the UK other creative uses of pension monies are emerging most notably in Islington who earmarked a massive 15% of its entire fund for social housing.  These investments have support from many unions who know access to affordable housing is a problem for many public sector workers as much as for anyone else.

At the heart of a democratic local economy has to be new social forms of ownership and support for local businesses.  In Preston, we are working with the Chamber of Commerce to encourage retiring business owners to sell their companies to their employees.  We have a number of new democratic firms including an artists cooperative of over 60 independent local artists, an educational psychologists worker cooperative, an employee owned transport consultancy with 25 employee owners and plans are underway to bring a “Unicorn” style grocery to the city.  This is complimented by Preston City Council earmarking a city centre investment of at least £5 million in its outdoor markets to support independently owned businesses to further capture wealth in the local economy.

Municipal enterprise can also play a key role and Preston City Council has a long term objective to generate energy from wind and solar power in municipal ownership to break the stranglehold of the Big 6 energy giants though this is under considerable threat from the cuts in renewable energy subsidy from Government.  However it is something we will look to do when it becomes viable.  Other Councils such as Nottingham have already ventured into the energy market recently having a positive impact on their local economy.

Credit unions and community development financial institutions (CDFI’s) are gradually expanding in Preston’s economy mirroring the growth of credit unions across the country.  The Labour administration recently fulfilled a long term commitment to establish a new city wide credit union “Guild Money” that has had over 150 members join in a very short period of time.  This is complemented by Lancashire Moneyline, a smaller credit union in Moor Nook, a number of workplace credit unions and trade unions promoting their own credit unions to members building a culture of democracy and financial inclusion.

Finally, we have insisted on quotas for affordable housing and health infrastructure as part of Preston’s Local Plan to capture community benefit from conventional development including a 30% affordable housing requirement and we have expanded the living wage by encouraging local employers to pay it through Preston City Council and its living wage partners procurement strategies.  This has seen Preston as a traditionally deprived community outperform more prosperous areas in Lancashire in terms of people receiving the living wage with a positive effect particularly on women.

With any debate about austerity and its causes we need to look to nurture creative responses and consider how we can best defend communities against it in future by making them more resilient, democratic and self-reliant.  Maybe just maybe with this new thinking emerging from Preston and elsewhere both here and abroad we are finding the answers to this system problem and uncovering the beginnings of what could become a truly democratic economy.  Time to watch this space.

Councillor Matthew Brown is Cabinet Member for Justice, Social Inclusion and Policy at Preston City Council

Devolution deals: three risks

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Devolution to city regions is a central pillar of the conservative government’s industrial strategy. The ‘Northern Powerhouse’ model developed in the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) is being rolled out through ‘Devolution Deals’ and the Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill. Advocates of devolution argue that it can close regional disparities in economic output by boosting growth in city regions. It is also argued that closer proximity of devolved administrations allows policy to be tailored to local needs; that devolution contributes to increased dynamism by creating opportunities for local innovation and increases local participation and accountability. As recently summarised by the Local Government Association these are points of consensus in British policy circles.

However, the evidence of devolution as a driver of economic growth, convergence in social and regional inequalities and is pretty thin.  For example, one analysis of devolution concluded that the evidence in favour of such links is very weak and another found a moderately negative relationship. It seems that this evidence is overlooked by the general consensus in favour of devolution amongst policy makers.  In this blog, I will set out three key ‘risks’ that explain failure to deliver on the ‘economic dividend’ argued for by so many proponents of devolution.

The balance between the transfer of resource and responsibility

It is often argued that the ‘litmus test’ of devolution is the balance between the transfer of policy responsibility and resource capacity. On this test, it can be said devolution in the UK has been non-existent in recent history – the purse strings have remained under tight Whitehall control. Research on the coalition government’s devolution reforms found that the scale of devolved functions heavily outweigh the devolution of resources to carry these out effectively. In order for local units to exercise devolved responsibilities effectively, resources and resource raising powers need to be commensurate with responsibilities. The Conservative government’s devolution deals are being pursued in a context of even harsher projected public spending cuts. It is therefore difficult to avoid the cynical conclusion that devolution forms part of a broader agenda to transfer the responsibilities of managing cuts to lower government tiers, rather than a genuine attempt to construct a more decentralised political economy.

Exacerbating inequality

‘Devolution deals’ seem to involve a more fundamental shift of power away from central government than previous attempts at devolution. However, these deals are struck on a case by case basis. Some resource raising powers are on the table, but some regions receive more powers that others – leading to an asymmetric distribution of powers that could exacerbate existing inequalities. Even if these were uniformly devolved, the ability to capitalise upon these is likely to differ across city-regions.  It is also noteworthy that many of the policies that previously distributed the proceeds of the UK’s London and finance-centric economic model are being discontinued by the austerity agenda. Recent research by the Institute for Fiscal Studies makes it clear that measures such as the ‘Living Wage’, which is presented as mitigating these impacts, will do little to compensate for those at the cutting edge of these reforms. Compounded by the imbalance between the devolution of functions and resources noted above, heed should be taken of the possibility devolution to city regions serves as a model for the shrinking the welfare state.

Collaboration and co-ordination between regions and governance tiers

Devolution deals are concerned with arrangements for individual cities and city-regions. Beyond the aspiration for a larger collective contribution to national economic output, there is little focus on the relationships between regions and the impact on devolution deals upon the overall functioning of the economy. Because of this, analysts of devolution have raised the possibility that rather than leading to an “effective and coherent yet more locally autonomous system of government”, devolution policy in the UK might deliver “a disconnected set of governance fiefdoms pursuing more or less strategic ends with varying degrees of competence”.  A related likelihood is the devolution deal model will encourage competition over collaboration between city-regions. As economist James Meadway argues “by granting large cities more powers on the allocation of spending, but leaving the level of taxation, spending and borrowing under tight Treasury control, regions will be forced into competitions with each other to attract business expenditure and therefore extra tax revenues”. This could lead to a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ that would substantially undermine the collective potential of city-regions to deliver improved economic and social outcomes.

In conclusion, a viable model for a more decentralised political economy should:

  • transfer ‘effective’ policy autonomy by providing adequate resourcing opportunities for devolved units;
  • reduce inequality within and between regions and social groups;
  • provide effective co-ordination between regions and governance tiers.

Although devolution deals are an emergent approach whose outcomes are not yet evident, the ad-hoc and case by case nature of the devolution deals, and the context of harsh public spending cuts within which they are taking place, are likely to lead to negative outcomes regarding the three areas above. It is therefore quite doubtful that devolution deals can constitute a viably generalisable model to deliver a more decentralised and effective political economy.

Adrian Bua is Research Assistant at the Centre for Urban Research on Austerity, as well as at the New Economics Foundation

Collaborative Governance under Austerity: an 8 Case Comparison

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CURA’s first research project is Collaborative Governance under Austerity: An eight-Case comparative Study, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. The project will run from April 2015 to September 2017 and is exploring austerity governance in eight cities: Athens, Baltimore, Barcelona, Dublin, Leicester, Melbourne, Montreal and Nantes.

For emergent findings see here, and for more information the project here, and here